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INTRODUCTION 
Inducing governmental organizations to do the right thing is the 
central problem of public administration. Especially sharp challenges 
arise when “the right thing” means executing not only a primary 
mission but also constraints on that mission (what Philip Selznick aptly 
labeled “precarious values”1). In a classic example, we want police to 
prevent and respond to crime and maintain public order, but to do so 
without infringing anyone’s civil rights. In the federal government, if 
Congress or another principal wants an executive agency to pay 
attention not only to its mission, but also to some other constraining or 
even conflicting value—I will call that additional value, generically, 
“Goodness”2—that principal has several choices. Congress can 
somehow impel the agency to try to seed the constraining value widely 
throughout its ranks—for example, by using supervision tools or 
incentives to get many agency employees to pay attention to Goodness.3 
Or Congress can empower some other federal organization more closely 
aligned with Goodness to play an augmented role in the agency’s 
affairs.4 This Article provides the first theoretical account of an 
 
 1 See PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
119–33 (1957). 
 2 I capitalize the term Goodness to indicate that the word is functioning as a stand-in for 
something of value, not as an endorsement of any particular normative judgment. 
 3 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-
Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009) (describing a “range of methods” to induce 
agencies to pursue secondary goals). These approaches can be harder or softer. One interesting 
new soft approach in the European Union is termed the “open method of coordination.” See, e.g., 
MILENA BÜCHS, NEW GOVERNANCE IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY: THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION (2007). 
 4 This approach is the subject of a rash of articles in the past several years examining the 
rationales and results of “overlapping” and “underlapping” jurisdiction among agencies. See, e.g., 
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and 
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2011); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency 
Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in 
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important third approach: furthering Goodness by giving it an 
institutional home, a subsidiary agency office I call an “Office of 
Goodness.”5 Offices of Goodness have often been created by Congress 
when it has sought to instill in particular agencies values that are 
important to the moving Members but less than central to the agencies; 
presidents, too, have created them for a variety of political ends. 
Activities by Offices of Goodness possess a logic and function 
worthy of academic recognition and explication; both policymakers and 
scholars should care about how, and when, Offices of Goodness work. 
But while Offices of Goodness are frequently established in federal 
agencies, they are all but invisible in prior scholarship.6 The resulting 
knowledge gap is consequential. For example, the Obama 
Administration has just placed a new Office of Goodness within the 
National Security Agency, to increase the presence of civil liberties 
values in surveillance policy development;7 without sufficient attention 
 
Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and 
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jason Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Jason Marisam, Interagency 
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013). 
 5 My Offices of Goodness have very little in common with Gary Lawson’s Goodness and 
Niceness Commission; Lawson used “Goodness and Niceness” to signal a maximally vague 
delegation, where I use Goodness as a stand-in for more definite values. See Gary Lawson, The 
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994). 
 6 An extremely useful exception is Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy 
Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008), which analyzes the 
Privacy Offices at DHS and the Department of State, and offers thoughts about why, when faced 
with similar issues, the former managed a far more robust set of interventions in its agency than 
the latter. It is, of course, also possible to find references here and there that acknowledge the 
strategy. See, e.g., MARK H. MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: JUNKYARD 
DOGS OR MAN’S BEST FRIEND? 15 (1986) (“In sum [in passing the 1978 Inspectors General Act], 
Congress chose the usual governmental response to an emerging political demand for some new 
purpose or value to be expressed in the operations of government—the creation of a separate, 
strengthened administrative unit whose primary goal is to advance the purpose or value that 
justified its creation.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT 371 (1989) (“If the organization must perform a diverse set of tasks, those 
tasks that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. This requires giving 
autonomy to the subordinate tasks subunit (for example, by providing for them a special 
organizational niche) and creating a career track so that talented people performing non-mission 
tasks can rise to high rank in the agency.”). 
 7 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference (Aug. 9, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-
press-conference (explaining that the National Security Agency is “taking steps to put in place a 
full-time civil liberties and privacy officer”); Edward Moyer, NSA Job Post for ‘Civil Liberties & 
Privacy Officer’ Goes Live, CNET (Sept. 20, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57603992-
38/nsa-job-post-for-civil-liberties-privacy-officer-goes-live. The President has also stated his 
support for a related, though slightly different, approach with respect to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, “calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates 
from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.” President Barack Obama, Speech on N.S.A. Phone Surveillance 
(January 17, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/politics/obamas-speech-
on-nsa-phone-surveillance.html. 
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to design details, such an office is likely to accomplish very little. For an 
Office of Goodness to actually increase Goodness in its agency, its staff 
must skillfully use a toolkit constrained by the Office’s placement within 
the agency they seek to influence, and they must avoid the twin shoals of 
impotence or capture/assimilation. This Article analyzes the relevant 
dynamics. I begin by describing a paradigmatic Office of Goodness, the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, and four issues in which it was involved between 2009 and 
2012. These examples then inform the Article’s theoretical contribution, 
a presentation of available tools and how the Office’s relationships with 
other stakeholders can increase or undermine its staff’s influence and 
commitment, which I suggest are the prerequisites for effectiveness. 
At an increased level of generality, the Article also contributes to 
the “structure and process” strand of positive political theory. The 
germinal articles in this literature were by the three collaborators known 
collectively as McNollgast;8 they argued that Congress can “stack the 
deck” in favor of agency outcomes it prefers, and facilitate its own 
focused oversight, by delineating the structure and process agencies 
must follow as they formulate policy. Structure and process theorists 
have analyzed numerous delegation choices through this lens, including 
notice and comment rulemaking,9 choice of agency mission and 
jurisdiction,10 use of “impact assessments,”11 and constraints on 
appointment and removal of personnel.12 Other political scientists 
studying agency design focus more on the President and less on 
Congress.13 Either way, as a prominent recent article by Elizabeth Magill 
and Adrian Vermeule summarizes, 
 
 8 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, 
Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control 
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); see also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing 
Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994). 
 9 See sources cited supra note 8. 
 10 E.g., Gersen, supra note 4; Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control 
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992). 
 11 E.g., McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 8, at 263–66; see also Bamberger & 
Mulligan, supra note 6. 
 12 See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (“By placing limits on the 
President’s power to appoint and remove independent agency heads as well as mandating limits 
on the number of the President’s own partisans that can be appointed, Congress made use of an 
institutional design that sought to limit presidential control of independent agencies.”). For a 
guide to the public choice literature on agency design, see Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne 
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 13 E.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003). 
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this literature for the most part treats “the agency” as a unit and asks 
how and why institutions such as Congress and the President impose 
various structural and procedural requirements on agencies. In other 
words, this literature (for the most part) asks how the black box 
should be shaped, not what lies inside it.14 
This Article (like Magill and Vermeule’s piece) takes as its subject 
the complex interactions among agency personnel inside that black box, 
and how those interactions are affected by and themselves affect 
outsiders. 
Scholarship written in the field of public administration or 
bureaucratic theory has a different blind spot. Research about how 
bureaucracies work15 focuses almost entirely on operational 
bureaucracies—bureaus that themselves issue regulations or carry out 
programs, or offices that supervise such bureaus, not offices that operate 
by influence instead of chain-of-command authority.16 Work in 
bureaucratic theory thus fails to offer a full account of the networks of 
authority and influence that constitute modern federal agencies. This 
Article’s observations demonstrate the importance of that gap, and 
begin to fill it, by focusing in particular on personnel who offer advice, 
rather than run agency operations, and elaborating many ways this 
 
 14 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1035 n.1 (2011). The point essentially holds for David Lewis’s book, PRESIDENTS AND THE 
POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN, supra note 13, because Lewis treats individual bureaus separately, 
rather than as parts of agencies. Magill and Vermeule examined how administrative law doctrine 
empowers or disempowers particular actors within federal agencies. 
 15 Classics include HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR (1960). See also ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); MICHAEL LIPSKY, 
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980); JERRY 
L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6. Or, 
more recently, see, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 
(2001); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010); STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND 
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008); AMY B. 
ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in 
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 326 
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic 
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 
1989). Two sources providing helpful guides to the public choice part of the literature are Ronald 
Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 429 
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997), and Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). 
 16 One insightful exception is ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980). 
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distinction makes a difference. The novel topic, that is, is soft rather 
than hard institutional design in federal agencies.17 
Part I sets the stage, identifying definitional features of an Office of 
Goodness, and describing the structure and authorities of one such 
office in particular, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL). CRCL sits in the DHS Office of 
the Secretary; it employs about a hundred civil servants, who carry out 
tasks ranging from administration of the Department’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity program to civil rights inspection of 
immigration detention facilities to civil liberties review of classified 
information sharing agreements.18 It makes an ideal ground for this 
study because it deals with subjects of high intragovernmental conflict 
and large public importance, and because much of its work has come to 
light in Freedom of Information Act document disclosures and 
investigative reporting. In Part II, I turn to four important controversies 
in which CRCL was a participant: the DHS role in information sharing 
relating to the Occupy movement; review of electronic device border 
search policy; Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance 
for local law enforcement; and the inter-agency negotiation over 
guidelines governing data ingestion and retention by the National 
Counterterrorism Center. All the information reported comes from 
publically available sources, which are cited, although I build, as well, on 
my experience as the presidentially appointed (but not Senate 
confirmed) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. (Of course the 
discussion here is my own and does not represent the views of the 
Department of Homeland Security or the Administration more 
generally.) I tell these stories in some detail in order to ground the 
subsequent analysis. 
Part III increases the analytic altitude and analyzes more 
systematically the ways in which Offices of Goodness intervene in 
agency operations. These interventions use a variety of methods, 
including: 
 Inclusion in policy formulation working groups 
 Clearance authority 
 Advice 
 Training and technical assistance 
 Program or operational review, including data analysis 
 Complaint investigation 
 Outreach to outside groups 
 
 17 See Adrian Vermeule, Soft Institutional Design, JOTWELL (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://adlaw.jotwell.com/soft-institutional-design. 
 18 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL 
REPORT FY 2011 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-
2011-final.pdf. 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
2014] OFFICES  OF GOO D NESS  59 
 
 Generation of documents 
 Congressional reporting 
Each method comes with its own risks and benefits, which are 
discussed. 
And increasing the elevation another 10,000 feet, in Part IV, I 
examine in more detail the relationships that either support or 
undermine Office influence and commitment to Goodness, its assigned 
value. Both influence and commitment, I argue, are continually under 
threat, and both depend crucially on external reinforcement, whether 
from Congress, the White House, non-governmental organizations, the 
courts, or other agencies. Again, I develop the dynamics in some detail. 
It has recently become a commonplace observation that the power 
of the presidency has expanded to the point that tripartite separation of 
powers model, which relies on Congress and the courts to rein in the 
Executive Branch, may not be up to the task. Much scholarship (and 
perhaps even practice) now emphasizes, instead or in addition, internal 
accountability mechanisms.19 Neal Katyal, for example, describes 
“internal separation of powers” methods, to “create checks and balances 
within the executive branch.”20 He notes that “[t]he apparatuses are 
familiar—separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of 
government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for 
agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial 
decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.”21 Likewise, Jack 
Goldsmith celebrates “something new and remarkable: giant distributed 
networks of lawyers, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside 
the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence 
services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and 
political constraints, small and large, against them.”22 
Both scholars and the American polity, would, to quote Gillian 
Metzger, “benefit[] from paying greater attention to internal 
administrative design, and in particular . . . analyzing what types of 
administrative structures are likely to prove effective and appropriate in 
 
 19 As Gillian Metzger has emphasized, the various internal and external methods interact 
crucially. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External 
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009). See also, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The 
Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006) (analyzing the structure of federal intelligence offices); cf. Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security 
Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009) (analyzing the structure of the Federal Security 
Agency). 
 20 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006). 
 21 Id. 
 22 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, 
at xi–xii (2012). 
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different contexts.”23 Without taking a stand on the overall separation of 
powers issues, in my view, the Office of Goodness strategy, already used 
by Congress and other principals, can be at least partially effective and 
appropriate. This Article raises the strategy’s visibility in scholarship, 
placing it more prominently on the menu of internal separation of 
powers devices for it to be further analyzed and assessed. 
I.     WHAT IS AN OFFICE OF GOODNESS? 
A.     Key Characteristics 
By “Office of Goodness” I mean an office within an operational 
agency that has each of three features (although many of the 
observations that follow might shed light on offices that have one or two 
of these characteristics, even if not all three): 
First, Offices of Goodness are advisory rather than operational. 
Offices of Goodness help other parts of the agency get work done; they 
are not the offices (or bureaus, to use the nomenclature most common 
in scholarship24) that themselves carry out the agency’s mission. This 
means that Offices of Goodness must operate by persuasion or coercion 
of others. Scholarship examining the dynamics of bureaucratic 
autonomy is highly relevant by analogy,25 but for Offices of Goodness, 
power lies less in autonomy than in influence—the ability to thwart 
another office’s autonomy.26 
 
 23 Metzger, supra note 19, at 425. 
 24 See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 41, available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/Sourcebook12.pdf: 
‘Bureau’ is a general term that refers to many different sub-units within larger 
departments that have different names such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Internal Revenue Service, or National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Like 
departments, bureaus vary in size and significance. In many departments the sub-
department bureaus have significant autonomy and authority; many departments are 
better characterized as holding companies of a number of distinct agencies rather than 
one large agency. The autonomy of sub-department agencies derives from a number of 
sources. Most have legal authority delegated to the bureau chief directly by legislation, 
rather than to the department secretary or the President. Large bureaus are also 
generally headed by Senate-confirmed political appointees, making bureau chiefs 
accountable to congressional committees directly rather than through higher 
departmental officials. 
 25 The leading source on agency autonomy and the techniques used to obtain and sustain it is 
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 15. 
 26 See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 150–52 (1987) (analyzing 
persuasion in federal agencies). 
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Second, Offices of Goodness are value-infused.27 The observations 
here apply to offices that are explicitly assigned to further a particular 
value that is not otherwise primary for the agency in which they sit. That 
value could be civil rights, consumer welfare, fiscal rectitude, etc. The 
Article calls it Goodness, but is agnostic on whether Goodness is 
actually good. A note in this regard: Where the value in question is 
“lawfulness,” the Office of Goodness is likely to be the agency’s Office of 
General Counsel. Jack Goldsmith writes, for example, of “the CIA’s 150 
or so lawyers,” naming them the “street-level bureaucrats” responsible 
for enforcing “compliance with the bevy of laws that Congress imposes 
and that the executive branch translates into more detailed executive 
orders, regulations, and directives.”28 Valuable (though limited) work 
has been done on general counsels’ offices;29 this Article builds on that 
scholarship, adding detailed description of an Office of Goodness that is 
not an Office of General Counsel, and also moving up one level of 
generality, to think about this type of office as an analytic category. The 
work done on Ombudsman’s offices is also relevant; although the values 
of “responsiveness” or “good government” typically assigned to such 
offices30 are rather diffuse. 
Third, Offices of Goodness are internal and dependent on their 
agency. The dynamics of a fully internal office are very different from 
one that has structural separation and independence. I deal here with 
non-independent internal offices, although of course independence is 
not dichotomous but rather exists along a spectrum.31 In my view, this is 
why the burgeoning work on the far more independent offices of 
 
 27 Cf. SELZNICK, supra note 1. 
 28 GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 22, at 93. See also, e.g., A. John Radsan, 
Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 201 (2008). 
 29 For analysis of the dynamics of federal Offices of the General Counsel, see, for example, 
sources cited supra note 28 and Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An 
Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (about Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps lawyers); Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron Zelinsky, Practicing 
International law in the Obama Administration, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Magill & 
Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1032, 1058–62, 1072–73; Thomas O. McGarity, The 
Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991). 
 30 Classic treatments of ombuds offices include: WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND 
OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES (1967); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN 
AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966); Larry B. Hill, 
Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1075 (1974); see 
also, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 845 (1975); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the 
Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95 (1996). 
 31 See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and 
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman 
& Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Kirti 
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013). 
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Inspectors General is enlightening but distinct. As that work describes, 
notwithstanding their organizational chart placement, Inspectors 
General have, at least since 1978, answered much more to Congress 
than to their Department heads.32 
B.     The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
The head of the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)—a presidential appointee reporting 
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security—is required by Congress 
to “oversee” DHS “compliance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, 
policy, and other requirements relating to the civil rights and civil 
liberties of individuals affected by the programs and activities of the 
Department. . . .”33 The relevant statutes empower the office to deal with 
both general policy development and review, and with more specific 
(and individual) civil rights complaints. CRCL’s statutes instruct the 
office to assist the Secretary and Department offices in policy 
development and implementation, including by periodically reviewing 
policies and procedures “to ensure that the protection of civil rights and 
civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs 
and activities.”34 The statutes also require the office to review and assess 
information and investigate complaints concerning civil rights and civil 
liberties abuses by DHS employees—including, explicitly called out by 
statute—alleged “profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion.”35 
In addition, CRCL is required to more generally “ensure that [the 
Department] has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond 
to, and redress” civil liberties complaints.36 
 
 32 See CARMEN R. APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2011); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: 
INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); INSPECTORS GENERAL: A 
NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (Michael Hendricks et al. eds., 1990); MOORE & GATES, supra note 6; 
Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2027 (1998); Ryan M. Check & Afsheen J. Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA’s 
Inspector General, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247 (2010); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie F. 
Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to 
Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1984); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing Nature of 
Accountability: The Role of the Inspector General in Federal Agencies, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 129 
(1998); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security 
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013). 
 33 See 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(4) (2012). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the office 
and directed the Secretary to appoint its head, who was instructed much more briefly to “review 
and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling 
by employees and officials of the Department[.]” Pub. L. 107-296, § 705(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2135, 2220 
(2002). 
 34 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(3) (2012). 
 35 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(1) (2012). 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a)(4) (2012). 
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So that CRCL can carry out these tasks, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security is instructed to ensure that the CRCL Officer: 
(1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill 
the functions of such officer; 
(2) is advised of proposed policy changes; 
(3) is consulted by decision makers; and 
(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to 
be necessary to carry out the functions of such officer.37 
And, crucially, Office is subjected to specific congressional 
reporting obligations. The CRCL Officer is required to file quarterly 
Congressional reports about the office’s activities, including, most 
importantly, “the type of advice provided and the response given to such 
advice;” and “a summary of the disposition of . . . complaints, the 
reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of such 
officer.”38 Correspondingly, the Secretary is required to file an annual 
congressional report “detailing any allegations of [civil rights or civil 
liberties] abuses . . . of this section and any actions taken by the 
Department in response to such allegations.”39 
Congress has also made subsequent more specific use of CRCL and 
its head, instructing the Secretary to “consult” with the CRCL Officer in 
developing several specified programs;40 requiring CRCL to develop or 
certify civil liberties training for particular personnel;41 and asking for 
CRCL-authored reports both before and after programs are 
implemented.42 In addition, DHS Secretaries have publically assigned a 
variety of tasks to CRCL, declaring the office responsible for training, 
policy assessment and recommendations, and particular participation in 
 
 37 Id. § 2000ee-1(d). 
 38 Id. § 2000ee-1(f)(2)(B), (D). 
 39 6 U.S.C. § 345(b) (2012). 
 40 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h (requiring the Secretary to consult with the CRCL Officer in 
establishing a DHS Fusion Center Initiative); 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (same, for certain public 
transportation research and development projects); 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (same, for railroad security 
research and development); 6 U.S.C. § 1185 (same, for bus security research and development). 
 41 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned 
to a fusion center to undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored 
by . . . the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department”); 6 U.S.C. § 124i (same, 
for Information Sharing Fellows). 
 42 See 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the CRCL Office to conduct appropriate reviews of certain 
DHS public transportation research and development projects); § 1168 (same, for railroad 
security research and development); 6 U.S.C. § 1185 (same, for bus security research and 
development); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317–24 (requiring the CRCL Officer to submit a report to Congress 
and others on the civil liberties impact of the Fusion Center Initiative); § 512 (same, Information 
Sharing Fellows Program); § 521 (same, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
Group); § 1523 (same, for Northern Border Railroad Passenger program). 
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specified Departmental tasks and processes. Several of these are 
discussed in Part II, below. 
CRCL is very different from the civil rights offices of most federal 
agencies. In contrast with CRCL’s inward-looking 
advisory/review/watch-dog function, most agency offices of civil rights 
(OCRs) combine a more substantively limited role inside the agency—
administering equal employment opportunity programs—with a more 
operational regulatory role outside the agency—enforcing the 
antidiscrimination obligations of supported organizations.43 (The 
Department of Agriculture’s Civil Rights Office, described in the Border 
Patrol Interpretation section below (Part II.C), is a partial exception 
from this general pattern. And the most well-known of the federal civil 
rights offices, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, is 
different altogether; as a litigating office of the Justice Department, its 
primary mission is to sue non-federal defendants, so it is nearly entirely 
outwardly focused.) But while DHS CRCL is unusual among cabinet 
department civil rights offices, it is far from unique in its structure. 
DHS’s foundational 2002 statute birthed not only CRCL, but also its 
DHS sibling, the Privacy Office, along similar lines.44 And a 2007 statute 
that confirmed and expanded CRCL’s authority similarly either 
confirmed or led to the creation of analogous offices—although 
generally combining privacy and civil liberties, and not mentioning civil 
rights—within the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Treasury, and 
Health and Human Services; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.45 The structure of each 
office varies; some are led by presidential appointees, others by political 
appointees who must be approved by the Presidential Personnel Office 
but are technically appointed by the Department Head; still others are 
led by career staff.46 Expanding the field of vision beyond either civil 
 
 43 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE 
VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995) (describing operations of Education OCR); JEREMY 
RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989) (same for 
Health, Education and Welfare OCR); Olatunde Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: 
Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339 (2012) (same for HUD Office of Fair 
Housing and Equal Opportunity); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement 
in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the 
Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (same for 
HHS OCR). 
 44 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 222, 116 Stat 2135, 2155 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §142 (2012)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-2 (2012). 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011, 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3658–59, 3688 (creating a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and a Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Officer within the Executive Office of the President). 
 46 For example, the Defense Department’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy, and Civil 
Liberties Officer is a career member of the armed services. See Michael L. Rhodes, Director of 
Administration and Management (OSD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/bios/
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rights or civil liberties, offices that satisfy the three “Offices of 
Goodness” criteria set out above are scattered throughout government. 
They have titles like the Department of Energy’s Office of Economic 
Impact and Diversity, or the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of the 
Taxpayer Advocate.47 Many are called Ombudsman’s offices.48 It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to either catalog or discuss all of these 
offices—the point here is only that their use by Congress is a general 
regulatory strategy worthy of analysis. 
II.     WHAT DO OFFICES OF GOODNESS DO? FOUR VIGNETTES. 
In this section, I describe four civil rights controversies in which 
CRCL played a role,49 to thicken the description of available strategies 
and challenges. I look in turn at (1) the DHS role in information sharing 
relating to the Occupy movement in late 2011; (2) DHS electronic 
device border search policy; (3) Border Patrol’s policy relating to 
interpretation assistance for Northern Border law enforcement agencies; 
and (4) the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines governing data 
retention by the National Counterterrorism Center. For those interested 
in homeland security matters, the vignettes should be worthwhile in 
their own right. For those whose interest in this article is based on its 
contribution to administrative and bureaucratic theory, I hope the same 
will be true, but for each controversy, the relevant tools mentioned in 
the vignettes are discussed more thoroughly in Part III. 
 
biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=164 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); About the Office, DEFENSE 
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICE, http://dpclo.defense.gov/CivilLiberties/AbouttheOffice/
DPCLOStructure (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). The Department of Justice Chief Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Officer is a political appointee. And the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
Civil Liberties Protection Officer is a career civil servant. 
 47 For a discussion of the IRS Office of Taxpayer Advocate, see IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 
OVERSIGHT OF THE OFFICE OF TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND ACTIONS (2002), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/taxpayer_advocate_
oversight.pdf. 
 48 Outward-facing ombudsman’s offices are embedded, for example, in, inter alia, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission; Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of Public Engagement; Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, Office of Education, Global Outreach and Small Business Ombudsman; and Small 
Business Administration. DHS also has a freestanding Ombudsman for Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. For background, see Admin. Conf. of the United States, The Ombudsman 
in Federal Agencies, Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1993); ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, THE OMBUDSMAN: A PRIMER 
FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES (1991). On internal federal ombudsman’s offices, for workers, see D. 
Leah Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 559–97 (1998). 
 49 My own personal involvement in three of these controversies appears in the documents 
cited; however, I played no direct role in the Occupy issue. 
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A.     DHS and Occupy 
September 2011 saw the birth of the Occupy Wall Street protest 
movement in New York City; over subsequent weeks and months, 
Occupy grew and spread across the country. In many cities, Occupy 
began that fall with live-in encampments in parks and other public 
spaces. Nearly everywhere, city governments and law enforcement 
eventually enforced various curfew and anti-camping rules and shut 
down the Occupy camps. The Department of Homeland Security was 
involved in several ways. Occasionally a unit of DHS was a target of a 
protest. For example, an “Occupy Stewart” protest was held in 
November 2011 in front of the Stewart Detention Center, an 
immigration detention facility in Lumpkin, Georgia.50 The Coast Guard 
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (and to a lesser extent 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE) also monitored what 
was going on at several seaport protests, which had the potential of 
affecting their operations.51 And DHS’s Federal Protective Service, 
which is the law enforcement agency with responsibility for most of the 
nation’s federal buildings, took note of protests in the vicinity of those 
buildings52 and was the agency that enforced encampment prohibitions 
in (apparently) one location.53 
For the Federal Protective Service and for state and local law 
enforcement (often working through “fusion centers,” entities that are 
not part of the federal government, but are partially funded by, and 
networked with, DHS), the civil liberties challenge was to maintain 
“situational awareness,”—that is, knowledge of what was going on 
sufficient to facilitate appropriate police planning and presence—
without crossing over into more intrusive and objectionable monitoring 
 
 50 Jim Mustian, Crowd Calls for Closing of Stewart Detention Center; Two Arrested, LEDGER-
ENQUIRER (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/11/18/1824958/crowd-calls-
for-closing-of-stewart.html. 
 51 See E-mails among DHS staff during November and December 2011, in 5/3/2012 DHS 
FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE 95, 197, 292–94, 305–07, https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/353138-latest-batch-of-dhs-occupy-documents-contains.html (last visited Aug. 27, 
2014) (discussing protests at several sea ports).  
 52 See Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at 
Occupy Wall Street and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/
news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-
violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york (citing DHS FOIA REQUEST, 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/625736-ows-nppd-region-1-final.html (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014)). 
 53 See, e.g., E-mail from DHS spokesman Chris Ortman, to DHS Secretary’s Office staff (Nov. 
1, 2011, 11:45 AM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 45 
(statement on the record describing FPS role in Portland Schrunk Plaza arrests). 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
2014] OFFICES  OF GOO D NESS  67 
 
of First Amendment protected protest activity.54 Scattered throughout 
thousands of pages of relevant documents obtained via Freedom of 
Information Act request from DHS by Truthout, a non-profit 
independent news organization,55 is evidence of efforts to meet that 
challenge. For example, one document describes the stance of the 
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), a fusion 
center in San Francisco: “Other than a few smashed windows at a 
number of banks, today’s events have remained First Amendment 
protected protest activities. NCRIC is not monitoring protected activity, 
but is in touch with the Oakland EOC in the event circumstances 
change.”56 And when in October 2011, a report summarizing the 
Occupy protests to date and attributed to the DHS National Protection 
and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection was 
posted (and then reported and reposted on Rolling Stone’s blog site); the 
report was immediately pulled down; senior Department officials 
explained it was unauthorized and out of compliance with DHS policy.57 
Even situational awareness activities received some criticism from 
the civil liberties left—an article in Salon, for example, described them as 
a “policy of daily spying on activists”58; this was then labeled on the New 
York Times website by a civil liberties advocate as “inappropriate 
surveillance of protesters associated with Occupy Wall Street.”59 But 
such criticism fails to engage the reasonable needs of law enforcement 
agencies with responsibilities for federal buildings. It’s not obviously 
unreasonable for Federal Protective Service personnel to notice who is 
planning large events near the buildings they protect; in fact, it might be 
irresponsible for police not to notice such events. 
 
 54 Cf. 2 SELECT COMM. STUDY TO GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 211–23 (1976), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf (describing COINTELPRO). 
 55 See Jason Leopold, DHS Turns Over Occupy Wall Street Documents to Truthout, 
TRUTHOUT (Mar. 20, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/8012-dhs-turns-over-occupy-wall-
street-documents-to-truthout#files. 
 56 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Nov. 2, 2011, 8:58 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA 
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 95. 
 57 The report remains available at http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/13637_DHS%20IP%
20Special.pdf. The back and forth on pulling it down is discussed in e-mail traffic FOIA’d and 
posted by Truthout. See Jason Leopold, Top DHS Officials Went Ballistic Over Rolling Stone 
Contributor Michael Hastings’ OWS Report, Internal Emails Show, TRUTHOUT (July 31, 2012), 
http://truth-out.org/news/item/10634-dhs-on-rolling-stone-reporter-michael-hastingss-ows-
report-he-can-be-provocative-help-him-understand-our-mission. The e-mails themselves are 
posted at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3. documentcloud. org/documents/405431/ows-final-
release-package-part2.pdf, at 78, 94. 
 58 Natasha Lennard, DHS Had Policy of Daily Spying on Activists, SALON (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/03/dhs_had_policy_of_daily_spying_on_activists. 
 59 Jameel Jaffer, Privacy is Worth Protecting, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-
imagined. 
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Units of DHS designated to help “fuse” information for many law 
enforcement agencies—the DHS National Operations Center and also 
DHS intelligence analysts assigned to the fusion centers—did not have 
such situational awareness needs. Accordingly, the challenge for them 
was a little bit less challenging; because their mission is more limited 
(covering homeland security matters only) a cleaner solution is possible. 
For example, when Chicago’s police department asked the National 
Operations Center to circulate to law enforcement in seven other cities 
an “RFI” (Request for Information) on Occupy encampments and 
arrests,60 that request was first distributed but then quickly recalled by 
top management, who explained: 
DHS I&A [Office of Intelligence & Analysis] personnel—both at 
Headquarters and in the field—may NOT be engaged in any efforts 
to gather information on First Amendment-protected activities that 
have no direct nexus to violence or that are otherwise outside the 
scope of DHS I&A authorities. Such inquiries should be strictly 
limited to law enforcement channels.61 
So far I’ve quoted various DHS actors’ nods towards First 
Amendment values. But what about CRCL? CRCL’s involvement had 
several related strands, described below. CRCL’s training role may have 
raised awareness of First Amendment red flags, and also ratified CRCL’s 
role and expertise. In addition, CRCL used that role and expertise to 
explain and underscore the importance of avoiding First Amendment 
infringements. And finally, in some limited situations, CRCL had 
clearance authority, so that CRCL approval was more or less required 
for promulgation of a document. 
Training. In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, Congress required that each DHS officer or 
intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center undergo civil liberties 
training “developed, supported, or sponsored” by CRCL.62 The same law 
likewise required that each fusion center provide “appropriate privacy 
and civil liberties training” for all personnel, “in coordination with” 
both the DHS Privacy Office and CRCL.63 The training provided is 
limited: CRCL gives the DHS intelligence analysts just a few hours’ 
overview of civil rights and civil liberties background, and trains trainers 
(and provides materials) for the fusion center personnel. Critics have 
 
 60 See E-mails from Chicago Police Department Officials, to Other Police Department 
Officials, in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 245–57. 
 61 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Nov. 9, 2011, 5:44 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA 
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 251. 
 62 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 63 6 U.S.C. § 124h(i)(6) (2012). 
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suggested this is inadequate64—although perhaps it is sufficient for 
raising awareness, if not for creating experts. In any event, the training 
requirement does introduce each of the intelligence analysts to the 
existence and role of CRCL. The results are evident in the Occupy FOIA 
document in one e-mail from an employee at the Office of Intelligence 
& Analysis to a National Operations Center intelligence analyst, who 
had received a law enforcement request for information about Occupy 
protests. The e-mail warned: 
[P]lease be very cautious in responding to requests related to 
constitutionally protected activities. Feel free to reach out to our 
CR/CL office if you have any doubt when asked to support 
requirement[s] you feel are questionable prior to taking any action.65 
Similarly, after Pittsburgh’s municipal Office of Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security (not part of DHS) distributed a 
“Threat Assessment” about Occupy Pittsburgh,66 two DHS employees 
who saw this document became concerned that it “might be advocating 
surveillance and other countermeasures to be employed against 
activities protected under the 1st Amendment,” and contacted CRCL to 
seek some kind of responsive training document “so that in the future 
[the local authors of the Threat Assessment] have a greater awareness of 
how to develop intelligence assessments that don’t undermine 
Constitutionally protected speech and assembly rights[.]”67 
Technical assistance. More directly within DHS’s own walls, staff 
from DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis explained in an October 17 
e-mail that they were receiving numerous “questions and requests for 
information regarding Occupy Wall Street from a number of 
component partners and intelligence officers.” The e-mail explained 
their first answer: “Recognizing that this is a first amendment-protected 
activity, we have recommended (on an ad hoc basis when we received 
requests) that our Intelligence Officers refer inquiries to Fusion Centers 
and avoid the topic altogether.” But the e-mail requested more formal 
guidance from CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office.68 
 
 64 See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T 
AFFAIRS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE & LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 49 
(2012), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-
involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers. 
 65 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:48 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA 
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 188. 
 66 PITTSBURGH OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT. & HOMELAND SEC., THREAT ASSESSMENT 
(2011), available at http://nigelparry.com/enginefiles/uploads/occupyassessment.pdf. 
 67 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Oct. 7, 2011, 10:04 AM), in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT 
RESPONSE (PART 1) 2, http://truth-out.org/files/12-0048-First-Interim-Release_OWS_Part1.pdf. 
 68 See E-mail from Shala Byers, to [redacted] (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:30 AM), in DHS FOIA 
DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 5. 
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Privacy Office and CRCL staff explained to the Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis manager who requested the guidance that 
simply referring the inquiries to Fusion Centers might “give the 
appearance that DHS is attempting to circumvent existing restrictions, 
policies, and laws.” The right approach, they argued, was that “DHS 
should not report on activities when the basis for reporting is political 
speech,” and should “also be loath to pass DHS requests for more 
information on the protests along to the appropriate fusion centers 
without strong guidance that the vast majority of activities occurring as 
part of these protests is protected.”69 Not that there was a ban on 
reporting: “Persons demonstrating illegal or suspicious behavior and 
attempting to use the protests to obscure their activity could be 
reported, as long as there is no attempt to link the suspicious/illegal 
behavior to first amendment protected activity.”70 
The FOIA’d e-mails include resulting guidance promulgated by 
Office of Intelligence & Analysis leadership to DHS intelligence analysts. 
It stated: 
Activities such as speech and assembly (both of which are implicated 
in the planned “occupy” protests) are protected by the First 
Amendment and generally DHS would not collect information or 
report on these types of activities unless we had a compelling interest 
to do so. Below is some general guidance that we hope you find 
helpful. 
 The government may never collect or disseminate 
information based solely on First Amendment protected 
activities, or conduct investigations on that basis. 
 Generally, reporting should be about the violence or 
criminality of a particular individual or group. Reporting on 
activities without a nexus to violence or criminality often 
raises First Amendment concerns. 
o To justify research into and creation of a product 
containing First Amendment-protected activity, 
personnel should consider whether they have a 
lawful predicate (e.g. a lawful purpose to perform 
their authorized law enforcement functions or other 
activities, that is not based on the protected activity 
itself). 
o Once a lawful predicate has been established, 
personnel should ensure the scope of the research 
and reporting on First Amendment-protected 
 
 69 E-mail from Privacy Office staff, to [redacted] (Oct. 17, 2011, 12:37 PM), in DHS FOIA 
DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 85. 
 70 Id. 
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activity is limited to the threat posed. This is often 
referred to as congruence. 
 The treatment of groups that may be involved in the First 
Amendment protected activity or related events should be 
even-handed and free of bias (e.g., not reporting more 
extensively or negatively on one group based on their 
viewpoint alone). 
The e-mail closed with an expression of collegiality: “Please let us 
know if you have any other questions, or if you require CRCL support 
in any other way. The CRCL office has been extremely helpful and 
responsive on this issue and they stand ready to assist.”71 
The e-mails include other evidence of more particularized advice 
seeking and giving. One episode involved a DHS intelligence analyst 
who asked about an incident in which an SUV was set on fire. He 
explained: 
I ran across this today and was interested in a possible write up of the 
event for the state and locals. Before I spent the time writing on this, 
however, I’d like to know what objections CRCL might pose to such 
a product concerning the Occupy movement—which has thus far 
been nonviolent.72 
The e-mail chain includes debate among CRCL staff members 
about whether any reporting on the incident, at all, would be 
appropriate in light of the DHS mission. What was sent back to the 
intelligence analyst notes that CRCL staff were: 
particularly concerned about attribution of the incident. The article 
notes that the police say they don’t know who set the fire or why they 
did it, and while some of the graffiti contains slogans consistent with 
some of the Occupy movement’s protests, the police say it would be 
“unfair to blame any one group” for the incident, and the 
spokesperson for Occupy Eugene denounced the event and said it 
was not part of their tactics. Unless there is other intelligence that 
indicates that the vandalism can be attributed to the group, the 
product would have to be very careful not to attribute the incident to 
the movement.73 
Accordingly, 
[i]f I&A believes the incident in Eugene merits nationwide reporting, 
it would be preferable for I&A to write up the incident in a manner 
 
 71 E-mail from Shala Byers, to Ann C. Wessel, in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), 
supra note 67, at 61. 
 72 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:39 PM), in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT 
RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 13. 
 73 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra 
note 67, at 47. 
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that takes care not to attribute the action to Occupy (absent further 
information), rather than to write a general product about Occupy 
and add to that product a write-up of the incident (as the context of 
the product would make it difficult to convey that we have no 
information that the incident may be fairly attributed to Occupy, 
rather than someone merely sympathetic to their ideology). 
Generally, it would be difficult for DHS to justify a product on the 
Occupy movement at this time. As you note, the movement has been 
largely non-violent, and what criminal activity has taken place has 
mostly been of the civil disobedience variety (failure to 
secure/overstaying permits, non-violent resistance to arrest), with 
occasional violent resistance to being removed from a 
location/arrested, etc., and it is unclear what is appropriately 
attributable to the Occupy movement versus individuals who may 
later enter into a conflict with policy. Other concerns appear to be 
health and safety related (use of heating equipment, disposal of trash, 
etc). As these concerns generally are localized and not related to 
domestic terrorism, to our knowledge, it would be difficult for DHS 
to justify a product on what is largely First Amendment protected 
activity that doesn’t appear to have a nexus to a DHS mission.74 
The intelligence analyst decided not to write the report. 
Clearance authority. CRCL had not always played this influential a 
role in intelligence reporting at DHS. In fact, in April 2009, an Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis report on “Right-Wing Extremism”75 was issued 
over CRCL’s objection.76 The report was marked “For Official Use 
Only”77 but was widely distributed to law enforcement agencies, and 
promptly leaked and posted online.78 Defining right-wing extremism to 
include groups “that are mainly antigovernment, rejecting federal 
authority in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting government 
authority entirely,” as well as “groups and individuals that are dedicated 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, RIGHTWING 
EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN 
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/right
wing.pdf. 
 76 See Tom Brune, Homeland Security Admits Error with Extremism Report, NEWSDAY (Apr. 
17, 2009), www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/homeland-security-admits-error-with-
extremism-report-1.1219261. The story is told in DARYL JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE: 
HOW A DOMESTIC TERROR THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012), written by the intelligence analyst 
who drafted the Right-Wing Extremism paper. 
 77 The FOUO designation was supposed to bar distribution outside of the government. See 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MGMT. DIRECTIVE SYS., SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
(FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) INFORMATION (2005), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/foia/mgmt_directive_110421_safeguarding_sensitive_but_unclassified_information.pdf. It 
has since been officially supplanted by the designation “Controlled Unclassified Information.” See 
Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 4, 2010). 
 78 The leak was to Rodger Hedgecock. JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE, supra note 76, at 
3. 
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to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration,” it 
warned that gun control opponents and veterans were plausible recruits 
to violent extremism, and cast aspersions on Republicans more 
generally by stating that opposition to the Obama administration’s 
policy positions was “galvaniz[ing]” extremists.79 The resulting furor 
from conservative constituencies,80 and then from both Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress,81 considerably enhanced CRCL’s authority; 
the Secretary apologized to veterans for the report82 and an internal 
directive was issued requiring clearance of all non-classified intelligence 
analysis by CRCL personnel, as well as by Privacy and the Office of the 
General Counsel. The clearance authority was not absolute, but to issue 
a document over the leadership-level objection of one of those offices, 
Intelligence & Analysis was required to appeal to the Deputy 
Secretary—a significant augmentation of the reviewing offices’ 
influence.83 
Returning to the Occupy issue, what’s notable in the Occupy FOIA 
releases is that there is no evidence of an actual DHS intelligence report 
about Occupy. This kind of product would have been subject to CRCL’s 
clearance authority. Perhaps that’s because I&A leadership lacked 
interest in such a product. Or perhaps it’s because clearance would have 
been implausible. As one of the e-mail chains between two CRCL 
employees notes: 
W/r/t a larger report on the Occupy movement, do you mean that 
you don’t think CRCL could clear on any product on OWS [Occupy 
Wall Street], generally? I tend to agree that it would be difficult to 
 
 79 Id. at 242. 
 80 See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, Confirmed: The Obama DHS Hit Job on Conservatives is Real, 
MICHELLE MALKIN (Apr. 14, 2009), http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/14/confirme-the-obama-
dhs-hit-job-on-conservatives-is-real (“[T]he piece of crap report issued on April 7 is a sweeping 
indictment of conservatives . . . .”). Numerous organizations responded by calling for the removal 
of Secretary Napolitano. She responded with an apology and a promise to revamp the intelligence 
product clearance process, including by augmenting the authority of CRCL. Jackie Kucinich, 
Napolitano Atones for DHS Report, ROLL CALL (May 7, 2009), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_
127/-34696-1.html. 
 81 See, e.g., Letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson to Secretary Janet Napolitano (April 
14, 2009), available at http://www.yallpolitics.com/images/ThompsonLetter041609.pdf. 
 82 See Ginger Thompson, Extremist Report Draws Criticism; Prompts Apology, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 16, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/extremist-report-
draws-criticism-prompts-apology/?_r=0. 
 83 See FY2010 Budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland 
Security: Hearing Before the H. Homeland Sec. Subcomm. Intelligence, Information Sharing and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Bart Johnson, Acting Under 
Secretary) (“To strengthen our existing processes, an interim clearance process was put in place 
shortly after the release of the April 7, 2009 assessment. That process established mandatory 
review and concurrence by four offices—Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office, Office 
of the General Counsel, and I&A’s Intelligence Oversight Section. Any non-concurrence that 
could not be resolved was elevated to the Deputy Secretary for review, ensuring a much more 
coordinated review of I&A’s products than had previously been in place.”). 
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clear on that, given that any concerns out of the movement thus far 
are local matters: reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on 
protests, health and safety issues, etc, all seem to be situational 
awareness issues (not domestic terrorism-related) that apply only to 
locals dealing with particular protests, and therefore, lack a DHS 
nexus for reporting. Given that their only foray into illegal activity, as 
a movement, seems to be violating permit rules and clashes with the 
police over removals (mostly, but not exclusively, through civil 
disobedience tactics), a product would tend to appear as merely 
reporting on First Amendment activity.84 
All in all, the e-mails and documents paint a portrait of a large 
agency with many people thinking hard—and, I think, appropriately—
about the First Amendment issues. There are no smoking guns of 
repressive action or inappropriate monitoring.85 CRCL seems, from this 
evidence, to have played an important out-of-view part, mostly in 
educating agency personnel about the suggested non-interventionist 
approach, with that education reinforced by the somewhat authoritative 
role in intelligence product review the office had accreted after a prior 
public contretemps. 
B.     Laptop Searches 
In February 2008, a Washington Post story profiled a number of 
American citizens who claimed their cell phones and laptops had been 
searched, copied, and even confiscated by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) when they were questioned at the border on their 
return to the United States from travel abroad.86 The article’s news hook 
was a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed the same day by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Asian Law Caucus, seeking CBP 
policy documents relating to such border searches.87 While the issue had 
 
 84 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra 
note 67, at 32. 
 85 Truthout acknowledges this with evident regret, noting: “[T]he public still does not have a 
complete picture of what role, if any, the federal government played in dismantling the 
nationwide encampments. Unfortunately, about 250 pages of redacted documents released last 
week by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD), in response to Truthout’s 17-month-old Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request, does not contain any smoking guns that would put to rest that lingering 
question.” Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at 
Occupy Wall Street and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/
news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-
violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york. 
 86 Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/AR2008020604763.html. 
 87 After the case was filed, CBP provided most of the documents sought; the plaintiffs 
continued their challenge seeking additional information, but lost. Asian Law Caucus v. U.S. Dep’t 
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already made an appearance in several federal court opinions in 
criminal cases,88 the Post story made a real splash; laptop searches 
became newly salient for both civil rights groups and Congress. The 
matter was pressed, for example, at a Senate Judiciary subcommittee 
hearing titled “Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced 
by Americans Returning from Overseas Travel.”89 Bills were 
introduced,90 reports written,91 FOIA requests submitted,92 objections 
elaborated,93 and affirmative lawsuits filed.94 
In the middle of the controversy, DHS released materials on the 
extant policy and the prevalence of electronic device border searches. 
The released information showed that CBP policy allowed border 
officials to search (and copy) the contents of laptops and cell phones of 
any traveler—U.S. citizen or foreign national—undergoing border 
inspection, with or without suspicion. CBP also released information on 
the prevalence of laptop and cell phone searches: such searches occurred 
 
of Homeland Sec., No. C 08-00842 CW, 2008 WL 5047839 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (granting the 
government summary judgment). 
 88 See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1010–11 (5th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 533 F.3d 1003, 
1005 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 89 Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from 
Overseas Travel: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection). 
 90 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP Act of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1726, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Securing our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th Cong. (2009); Travelers’ Device 
Privacy Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008); Travelers’ Device Privacy 
Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008); Border Security Search Accountability Act of 
2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing Our Borders and Our Data Act of 2008, H.R. 6702, 
110th Cong. (2008); Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 91 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE 
CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP (2009), available at http://www.advancingjustice-
alc.org/sites/asian-law-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf; YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34404, BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES 
3 (2009); MUSLIM ADVOCATES: UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS: INVESTIGATING THE POLITICS, 
FAITH & FINANCES OF AMERICANS RETURNING HOME (2009), available at 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/175/attachments/original/13609
62341/Unreasonable_Intrusions_2009.pdf?1360962341. Later advocacy reports included 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND 
PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S POLICY (2011), available 
at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Border_Search_of_Electronic_Devices_0518_2011.pdf. 
 92 See Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU Staff Attorney, to Mark Hanson, FOIA Director, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
freespeech/laptopfoia.pdf. 
 93 See, e.g., ACLU Seeks Records About Laptop Searches at the Border, ACLU (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-seeks-records-about-laptop-searches-border. 
 94 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Abidor v. Napolitano, No. CV 10-
4059, 2010 WL 3477769 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010); see also House v. Napolitano, No. 11–10852–
DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (complaint filed May 13, 2011).  
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at a rate of 250 per month in the months of 2008 and 2009 covered by 
the disclosure95: miniscule as a percentage of travelers but still large as a 
number. Advocates and Congress were not satisfied by this information 
and kept the issue alive into the new administration, asking the new 
Secretary to review and revise the policy. On August 27, 2009, DHS 
announced new policies for both CBP and U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).96 Unlike the old policies, which had only 
been made public after substantial dispute, the new policies were 
immediately posted on the Department’s website. They were a bit more 
constraining than the versions they replaced. In particular, they 
included timeframes, banned detention of devices after searches were 
complete, required device owners be provided information on appeal 
rights, and added supervisory review. They did not, however, add an 
individualized suspicion prerequisite for searches. In addition, the 
Secretary instructed CRCL to conduct a “Civil Liberties Impact 
Assessment” within 120 days, a deadline of December 2009. 
Program Review. A “Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” is a report. 
The phrase calls to mind the Environmental Impact Assessments 
required by the National Environment Policy Act of 1969,97 and the 
Privacy Impact Assessments required by the E-Government Act,98 but 
whereas EIAs and PIAs have become institutionalized, analogues in 
other arenas have not.99 As of August 2009, CRCL had completed just 
 
 95 See Laptop Search Analysis, ACLU (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
laptop-search-analysis. I used this table to compute the average: http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
natsec/laptopsearch/Tab_24_Chart_with_formulas_08182010.xls. 
 96 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING 
INFORMATION, (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-
049.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, (2009), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf. 
 97 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
 98 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, M-03-22, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY 
PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 (“Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is an 
analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, 
regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of 
collecting, maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic 
information system, and (iii) to examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for 
handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks.”). 
 99 The idea of a civil liberties impact assessment seems to have made its first appearance in 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SECURING AMERICA, PROTECTING OUR FREEDOMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 
11, 228 (2005) available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/kf/Ch13-Civil%
20Liberties.pdf. See also Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ? What Counts in 
Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 609–24 (2006). As Marks points out, a 
proposal for a Human Rights Impact Assessment process in public health policy formulation was 
made over a decade earlier. Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan Mann, Toward the Development of a 
Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, 1 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 58 (1994). 
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four earlier Civil Liberties Impact Assessments.100 The concept of an 
impact assessment is to systematically examine both the risks posed by a 
planned or ongoing process, and costs and benefits of potential 
strategies for amelioration of those risks.101 This new electronic device 
searching impact assessment, the first started in the new administration, 
was not quickly forthcoming. In fact, it was not completed until 
December 2011, twenty months later than the Secretary had directed. 
And it was not immediately made public; although its completion was 
noted in a quarterly report to Congress,102 even a bare executive 
summary was not posted until over a year later, in January 2013.103 The 
to-be-expected FOIA request quickly followed,104 and in June 2013 DHS 
released a full version, albeit with legal analysis redacted.105 
The Impact Assessment—by this time titled a “Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties Impact Assessment”—took the position that suspicionless 
laptop searches by border agents did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. In this it lined up with all the Court of Appeals precedent 
extant at the time the document was completed.106 Between completion 
and release, the Ninth Circuit held, en banc, that forensic laptop 
searches, but not non-forensic searches, had to be justified by 
reasonable suspicion.107 Even though CRCL found no constitutional 
violations, the Impact Assessment nonetheless made five 
recommendations: 
 Record a reason for each search. “CBP officers who decide to 
conduct a device search generally should record the reason 
for the search in a TECS [computer system] field. To be 
clear, we are not recommending that officers demonstrate 
reasonable suspicion for the device search; rather we 
recommend that officers simply record the actual reason 
 
 100 See Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 101 Gostin & Mann, supra note 99, at 61. 
 102 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, THIRD QUARTER, FY2012 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/crcl-quarterly-report-fy-2012-q3_0.pdf. The report states that the 
Impact Assessment was completed in August 2012, id. at 8, but the report, when released, was 
dated December 2011. 
 103 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, CIVIL 
RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT: BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
(2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-search-
impact-assessment_01-29-13_1.pdf. 
 104 See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA 
Officer (Feb. 8, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_
foia.pdf. 
 105 See DHS FOIA RESPONSE (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-
border-search-impact-assessment_06-03-13_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). I am listed as the 
“reviewing official” on the report. 
 106 See sources cited supra note 88. 
 107 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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they are conducting the search, whatever that reason is. This 
recommendation exceeds constitutional requirements, but 
should facilitate CBP’s operational supervision and 
oversight.” 
 Explicitly ban race, religion, and ethnicity discrimination in 
searches, subject to narrowly tailored exceptions. CRCL 
recommended that CBP and ICE should supplement the 
Department’s overarching antidiscrimination policy by 
“stat[ing] explicitly in policy that it is generally 
impermissible for officers to discriminate against travelers—
including by singling them out for specially rigorous 
searching—because of their actual or perceived race, 
religion, or ethnicity, and that officers may use race, religion, 
or ethnicity as a factor in conducting discretionary device 
searches only when (a) the search is based on information 
(such as a suspect description) specific to an incident, 
suspect, or ongoing criminal activity, or (b) limited to 
situations in which Component leadership has found such 
consideration temporarily necessary based on their 
assessment of intelligence information and risk, because 
alternatives do not meet security needs.” 
 Collect data and conduct analysis of racial/ethnic disparate 
impact. “CBP should improve monitoring of the distribution 
of electronic device searching by race and ethnicity, by 
conducting routine analysis to “assess whether travelers of 
any particular ethnicity . . . at any port of entry are being 
chosen for electronic device searches in substantial 
disproportion to that ethnicity’s portion of all travelers 
through the port . . . . Data and results should be shared with 
CRCL.” 
 Remedy any detected disparate impact. If analysis suggests 
“that electronic device searching in any port has a 
substantial unexplained skew towards travelers of one or 
more ethnicity, CBP should work with CRCL on developing 
appropriate oversight mechanisms. Subsequent steps 
generally should include a requirement of supervisory 
approval for searches (absent exigent circumstances) or 
enhanced training, and may include other responses.” 
 Improve notice of redress avenues. “CBP should improve the 
notice given to travelers subjected to electronic device 
searches by updating tear sheets to refer travelers to DHS 
TRIP [Travelers Redress Inquiry Program] if they seek 
redress.” The assessment noted that TRIP’s intake categories 
were correspondingly expanded, to allow complainants to 
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reference not just discrimination but also abusive or coercive 
screening and free speech/free press violations.108 
CBP, the posted summary noted, had agreed to carry out each 
recommendation. 
Civil liberties advocates were quite unhappy with the Impact 
Assessment. The ACLU, for example, described it as “disappointing” 
and its logic as “faulty.”109 Arguing in favor of a reasonable suspicion 
standard for border searches in terms that were not limited to electronic 
devices,110 it summarized: “Even at the border, the Fourth Amendment 
requires more than just hunches. It is disappointing that the DHS 
watchdog dedicated to protecting our privacy and other civil liberties 
does not recognize that.” The blogosphere ridiculed the project of an 
internally-conducted impact assessment as illegitimate (“What else 
would you expect them to say?”), and commenters questioned the bona 
fides of CRCL, describing it as an “Orwellian”111 office that “probably 
functions more like an entity tasked with creating and promoting the 
legal justification for programs that violate laws or civil liberties.”112 
Lending credibility to the critics’ complaints was the Cotterman 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, en banc. In 
a decision rendered during the writing of the impact assessment, a 
Ninth Circuit panel had agreed with the United States in a child 
pornography prosecution that no individualized suspicion was 
necessary to justify a border inspection laptop search.113 A few months 
after completion of the assessment, however, though long before its 
release, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc,114 and in 
 
 108 See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA 
Officer (Feb. 8, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_
foia.pdf. 
 109 Brian Hauss, DHS Releases Disappointing Civil Liberties Report on Border Searches of 
Laptops and Other Electronics, ACLU (June 5, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty-immigrants-rights-national-security/dhs-releases-disappointing-civil. 
 110 The ACLU’s blog post on the topic noted, for example, “To be sure, rummaging around 
through people’s personal papers may well turn up the occasional bad guy, but that is not the only 
consideration.” Id. Of course, the government’s authority to “rummage[e] around through 
people’s personal papers” without any suspicion at all, if that rummaging is during a border 
inspection, is established. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 
2008) (summarizing cases upholding suspicionless searches of personal papers and effects during 
border inspections). 
 111 Mike Masnick, Homeland Security: Not Searching Your Laptop Doesn’t Benefit Your Civil 
Liberties, So We Can Do It, TECHDIRT (Feb. 11, 2013, 8:51 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20130208/17415621927/homeland-security-not-searching-your-laptop-doesnt-benefit-
your-civil-liberties-so-we-can-do-it.shtml. 
 112 Kevin Gosztola, DHS Finds Suspicionless Border Searches Do Not Violate Americans’ Civil 
Liberties, THE DISSENTER (Feb. 8, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/02/08/
dhs-finds-suspicionless-border-searches-do-not-violate-americans-civil-liberties. 
 113 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 114 United States v. Cotterman, 673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting rehearing en banc). 
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March 2013, reversed on this point.115 Forensic searches, the en banc 
court held, were far more intrusive than non-forensic examinations of 
electronic devices or of, say, luggage: “It is as if a search of a person’s 
suitcase could reveal not only what the bag contained on the current 
trip, but everything it had ever carried.”116 Accordingly, such searches 
were lawful under the Fourth Amendment only if supported by 
individualized “reasonable suspicion.” 
CRCL released the very short executive summary without fanfare—
indeed, without any notice or background at all. The same is true for the 
FOIA-prompted release of the entire report, months later. Any 
announcement would no doubt have emphasized the five 
recommendations in the impact assessment, and that each had been 
adopted by DHS. In any event, there was essentially no public 
discussion of those recommendations; coverage of the release in blogs 
and the press was entirely dominated by the civil rights and civil 
liberties community’s displeasure with the reasonable suspicion 
conclusion. This is true even though those recommendations gave the 
advocacy groups a great deal that they had previously sought, which 
might have been advantageously celebrated and even built upon in 
additional areas. The rule that CBP officers “record the reason” for any 
electronic device search went some distance, though not all the way, to a 
requirement that there be reasonable suspicion—yet this aspect of the 
report got no attention. The recommendation that the DHS Traveler 
Redress Inquiry Program complaint form—thousands of which are filed 
each year—led to modification of the options travelers can check to 
include complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews, 
allowing previously impossible monitoring of those issues.117 Even more 
striking, the CRCL-recommended articulation of a clear departmental 
rule against racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in border 
searching was something that civil rights and civil liberties groups had 
sought for years,118 filling a much-lamented gap in the federal policy on 
racialized law enforcement.119 And they had similarly long proposed 
data collection and analysis to monitor the possibility of bias in traveler 
 
 115 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
899 (2014). The en banc court held, however, that the facts available to the searching border 
agents were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, and therefore upheld the search. 
 116 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965. 
 117 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 18, at 26 (reporting that 10% of 
DHS TRIP complaints used those new checkoff boxes). 
 118 See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME, supra note 91, at 29 (“DHS ought to 
adopt a rule prohibiting law enforcement decisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, and national 
origin while eliminating the blanket exemption for national security and border investigations.”). 
 119 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE IN 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf (declining to extend federal policy restricting use of race to 
border decisions, including searches). 
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screening.120 All this was in the impact assessment’s accepted 
recommendations, but either nobody noticed or advocates decided that 
they gained more from decrying the reasonable suspicion conclusion 
and did not want to muddy their message by praising these other policy 
changes. 
C.     Border Patrol and Interpretation 
On May 14, 2011, Benjamin Roldan Salinas and his girlfriend, 
M.N., were harvesting salal in the Olympic National Forest. (Salal is an 
attractive groundcover plant; people get permits to pick it in Forest 
Service lands, and then resell it to florists.121) A Forest Service officer 
saw the couple from his car and immediately called the Border Patrol; 
based on his experience with salal harvesters and their limited English, 
the Forest Service officer asked Border Patrol for assistance with 
Spanish-language interpretation. He then stopped the car in which the 
two were driving and began to ask them questions (in English). When 
the Border Patrol car pulled up, both fled on foot. Salinas jumped into 
the Sol Duc River and was swept away.122 Ms. N. was arrested and 
charged with an immigration violation; news reports say that she was 
released after 10 days.123 Salinas was found three weeks later, dead, his 
body tangled in brush four miles down river.124 
The tragedy of a death increased considerably the focus by 
advocacy organizations on the topic, but the issue was far from new. 
Advocacy groups had for some time been concerned about Border 
Patrol enforcement near the northern border, arguing that it was unduly 
aggressive and often discriminatory. They pointed to the fact that the 
number of northern Border Patrol agents has skyrocketed, under 
 
 120 See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME, supra note 91, at 29 (“To allow Congress 
and the public to monitor compliance with this rule, DHS should require CBP officers to log the 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and nationality, as known or perceived, of each 
individual subjected to secondary inspections, searches of electronic devices, or other special 
security measures at each port of entry, and to report this information on an annual basis.”). Cf. 
RIGHTS WORKING GRP., RACIAL PROFILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION: WHAT DHS 
SHOULD COLLECT AND MONITOR (2011), available at http://rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/
files/Data%20Collection%20Recommendations%20for%20DHS.PDF (urging racial data 
collection in the different context of immigration enforcement, as well). 
 121 See Salal Permit Sales to Begin at Olympic National Forest, USDA FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/olympic/news-events/?cid=STELPRDB5327177. 
 122 The facts in this paragraph are taken from [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency 
Decision, FS-11-5171, 28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at http://www.nwirp.org/Documents/
PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforRelease.pdf. 
 123 See William Yardley, In Far Northwest, A New Border Focus on Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 2012, at A1; Lornet Turnbull & Roberto Daza, Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2011), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2015435439_
forks27m.html. 
 124 Turnbull & Daza, supra note 123. 
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congressional pressure, since 9/11;125 notwithstanding the small number 
of attempted illegal border crossings to engage those so assigned, the 
number of northern border agents in 2012 was over 2000, compared to 
about 300 a decade before.126 These agents spend a good deal of their 
time collaborating with local law enforcement, and advocacy 
organizations reported that much of this collaboration was initiated as 
calls by local law enforcement for language assistance. (All Border Patrol 
agents are required to speak functional Spanish.127) Once Border Patrol 
was on the scene, enforcement interviews and often immigration arrests 
frequently followed. 
Advocacy and community organizations complained that the 
practice violated the civil rights of their clients and participants. For 
agencies that receive federal financial assistance—which is to say, nearly 
every law enforcement agency128—the argument was founded on Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among other things, Title VI forbids 
national origin discrimination by federally supported organizations; in 
the 1974 case of Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that this ban 
covers language discrimination as well. (Indeed, the Court said in Lau, 
the challenged implementing regulation’s requirement that recipients 
take “affirmative steps to rectify . . . language deficiency” was 
permissible under Title VI. Across the government, Title VI regulations 
have similar provisions.129) So the argument is a simple one: the use of 
Border Patrol agents as interpreters by federally supported police 
departments is inappropriate, because it subjects Spanish-speakers to 
law enforcement inquiry and potential immigration consequences not 
faced by others, constituting language discrimination and a failure to 
provide appropriate language access. 
 
 125 See CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32562, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF 
THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 22 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
RL32562.pdf. 
 126 Just six weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of Border Patrol 
personnel assigned to the northern border, from its 2001 allotment of 340. By 2005, the number 
assigned had reached over 1000. Then in 2006, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638, 3734, required that 20% of the Border 
Patrol’s annual increases in manpower be assigned to the northern border. In Fiscal Year 2010 
and subsequent years, the number of Border Patrol agents was over 2,200. See UNITED STATES 
BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (OCT. 1ST THROUGH SEPT. 
30TH), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%
20Fiscal%20Year%20Staffing%20Statistics%201992-2013.pdf. 
 127 See HOME > CAREERS > JOIN CBP > WHICH CBP CAREER IS RIGHT FOR YOU? > BORDER 
PATROL AGENT, http://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp/which-cbp-career/border-patrol-agent (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 128 For an index to all the recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of 
Justice alone, see OJP GRANT AWARDS, http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/main (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014). 
 129 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). 
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Outreach and its uses. Just days after Mr. Salinas’s body was found, 
a leading advocacy organization highlighted the issue in an e-mail to 
CRCL staff, setting out allegations related to two different incidents—
Mr. Salinas was referred to only obliquely. The complaints led to a 
meeting between CRCL and Border Patrol in June 2011, “on the topic of 
provision of interpretive services and how to avoid having it chill 
immigrant calls to police, etc.”130 Documented in the response to a 
FOIA request, the e-mail and an accompanying memo summarizing the 
meeting’s resolution state that CBP and CRCL agreed to explore CBP 
use of “musters [that is, in-service training] or other relatively low-key 
guidance.” CBP was to coordinate with CRCL on “a draft guidance or 
muster on the topic of avoiding harm to community 
policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language 
interpretation.”131 The pressure from advocates and community groups 
was noted: “This is becoming a hotter topic by the day, and we really 
need to figure out an appropriately robust response.”132 
It is worth noting that under the Title VI theory, the civil rights 
violator is not the Border Patrol but rather the agency that calls Border 
Patrol. It is the agency that places that phone call that is allegedly 
breaching its language access obligations, discriminating against 
Spanish speakers; Border Patrol may be facilitating this breach, but it is 
not itself discriminating. The result is that CRCL’s jurisdiction over the 
Border Patrol interpretation issue was far from exclusive. The 
Department of Justice provides financial support for a high percentage 
of the nation’s law enforcement agencies, and therefore has Title VI 
authority. And the Department of Justice’s civil rights offices (both the 
Office of Justice Programs’ Office of Civil Rights, and the Civil Rights 
Division’s Federal Coordination and Compliance Section) face a very 
different environment than does CRCL with respect to CBP operational 
activities. The political and relational realities that make it difficult for 
an internal agency office to find another agency office’s conduct 
problematic are bound to be lessened in a situation in which the 
complained-about conduct is mostly conducted by another agency. I 
analyze in Part III the ways in which the potential involvement of a 
sister agency value-based ally, such as the Department of Justice, affects 
the hand of an office such as CRCL. Here, I will simply note that the 
 
 130 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, DHS Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, to Ronald 
Vitiello, Deputy Chief, Border Patrol (July 28, 2011, 7:57 AM), in 8/22/2012 DHS CRCL FOIA 
RESPONSE 86, available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/911_
FOIA_Response.pdf. 
 131 Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, to Meeting 
Participants (July 29, 2011), in 8/22/2012 CRCL FOIA Response 90, supra note 130. 
 132 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, supra note 130, at 85–86. 
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FOIA’d documents demonstrate that the potential for Justice 
Department involvement was clearly in the minds of the actors.133 
Complaint investigation. Immigrant rights advocates took 
advantage of the overlapping jurisdictional issue just a few days later; in 
July 2011, Ms. N (Mr. Salinas’s girlfriend) filed a complaint, not with 
DHS, but with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which 
the Forest Service is a component. Because Mr. Salinas’s death was after 
an encounter with a federal law enforcement agency, Title VI does not 
apply —the activity in question was “federally conducted,” in the 
language of federal civil rights offices, not “federally supported.” But, 
represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Ms. N.’s 
complaint argued that the Forest Service officer’s actions constituted 
race and national origin discrimination, in violation of USDA’s 
antidiscrimination regulation134 and Executive Order 13166, which has 
since 2000 forbidden federal agencies to discriminate against people 
with limited English proficiency. NWIRP’s argument was twofold. First, 
just as under Title VI, NWIRP argued that use of Border Patrol as 
interpreters was inappropriate, because it subjected Spanish-speakers to 
law enforcement inquiry and potential immigration consequences not 
faced by others stopped by Forest Service officers. Second, NWIRP 
claimed, that use was pretextual, perhaps a cover for hostility towards 
Hispanics or perhaps for the arresting Forest Service Officer’s interest in 
immigration enforcement, which should not have been his concern. The 
complaint included strong evidence on both theories, including an e-
mail sent on June 8, 2011, by the Forest Service Officer who was the 
subject of the complaint to several individuals complaining that in the 
aftermath of the incident, a community member was watching his 
house. A Border Patrol Officer on the e-mail chain responded, “[t]he 
great thing would be to request translation assistance so that we are able 
to sack this guy up.” As the USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights later noted, “[t]he implication of this email was that the 
practice of requesting interpretation assistance is a guise for initiating an 
immigration enforcement action. . . . The tone of this email clearly 
implied that this was a standing practice between FSO [the Forest 
Service Officer] and BP [Border Patrol].”135 
 
 133 See Memorandum, supra note 131, at 91 (“She and Officer Schlanger also discussed the role 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in enforcing these laws, and the recently-circulated draft DOJ 
Frequently Asked Questions . . . ”). 
 134 7 C.F.R. § 15d.3(a) (2014) (“No agency, officer, or employee of the USDA shall, on the 
grounds of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital 
status, family/parental status, income derived from a public assistance program, political beliefs, 
or gender identity, exclude from participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject to discrimination 
any person in the United States under any program or activity conducted by the USDA.”). 
 135 See USDA Complaint, supra note 122, at 28. 
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Complaining to USDA was a savvy piece of advocacy by NWIRP. 
USDA’s civil rights office is not just an Office of Goodness—it is 
uniquely empowered, among federal civil rights offices. Its operative 
regulation was promulgated by the Clinton Administration in 1999136 
just after the Department settled a mammoth fair-lending case to 
remedy generations of discrimination against African-American 
farmers.137 That regulation granted the USDA Office of the Assistant 
Secretary not just the authority to adjudicate complaints, but also to 
make “final determinations . . . as to the corrective actions required to 
resolve program complain[ts].”138 So unlike CRCL, which is authorized 
only to make recommendations to the Secretary and DHS offices, and 
required then to report to Congress those recommendations and the 
agency response,139 USDA’s civil rights office, led by a Senate-confirmed 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, has the regulatory authority to 
direct other USDA offices what to do.140 That authority seems not to be 
very often asserted (and was not utilized at all in the Bush 
administration), but it continues to exist.141 
Over the next months, as the USDA investigation moved along, the 
advocacy community worked to bolster its point of view by preparing 
two in-depth reports, each combining sympathetic facts, a rights-based 
 
 136 See Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,709 
(Nov. 30, 1999) (amending 7 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1999)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted 
Programs and Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 62,962 (Nov. 10, 1998) (amending 7 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1998)); 
Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,851 (Apr. 23, 
1996) (amending 15 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1996)). 
 137 See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999); see also TADLOCK COWAN & JODY 
FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF 
DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS (2012), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf. 
 138 64 Fed. Reg. 66,709, 66,710. The regulation has what looks like two corresponding 
scrivener’s errors. It reads: “The Director of the Office of Civil Rights will make final 
determinations as to the merits of complaints under this part and as to the corrective actions 
required to resolve program complainants. The complaint will be notified of the final 
determination on his or her complaint.” Id. (emphasis added). Clearly the two emphasized words 
should have been switched; see also 7 C.F.R. § 2.25(a)(13) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights to “make final determinations on both the merits and required corrective action” for 
program complaints). 
 139 See 6 U.S.C. § 345 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (2012). 
 140 I do not mean to take a position on the essentially hypothetical issue whether the Secretary 
would be empowered to instruct the Assistant Secretary how to use this regulatory authority. This 
is the analogue of the longstanding administrative law argument about the extent of presidential 
authority over decisions by executive branch officials. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250–51 & nn. 8 & 9 (2001) (citing scholarship on both 
sides of the question, and taking a position “accept[ing] Congress’s broad power to insulate 
administrative activity from the President, but argu[ing] that Congress has left more power in 
presidential hands than generally is recognized”). 
 141 See USDA, CIVIL RIGHTS AT USDA: A BACKGROUNDER ON EFFORTS BY THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA%20Civil%20Rights%20
Background.pdf; see also REPORTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS, RESOLUTIONS, AND ACTIONS, 
http://www.ascr.usda.gov/reports.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
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frame, and policy argumentation.142 The issue remained a live one at 
DHS, but the guidance mentioned in the memo summarizing the June 
2011 meeting did not issue. Indeed, in April 2012, there is evidence that 
CRCL at least considered seeking formal legal advice from the DHS 
Office of the General Counsel on the issue.143 In May, nine months after 
filing its USDA complaint, NWIRP took another step to increase inter-
agency pressure on DHS, filing another complaint, this time with the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, on 
behalf of five new complainants as well as (again) M.N. Each of the 
complainants had been stopped by non-immigration law enforcement, 
who called Border Patrol to help with interpretation. In each case, the 
Border Patrol agent who responded then questioned the complainant 
about his or her immigration status; several of them were put into 
immigration proceedings as a result. The theory of this complaint was 
the same as for the Forest Service complaint, except with a Title VI 
jurisdictional hook: 
We therefore believe that the interpretation/translation assistance 
justification is being used to cover a pattern of discriminatory 
enforcement activity that the agents themselves appear to realize is 
problematic. Hence, they report that their involvement was as a 
result of a request for interpretation assistance. The inescapable 
conclusion is that the actual or pretextual use of Border Patrol agents 
for interpretation assistance by law enforcement agencies is resulting 
in outright discrimination in one of two ways: 1) to the extent that it 
is really about language access, it constitutes impermissible 
discrimination because the price of such access for a segment of the 
LEP population is enduring questioning about citizenship and 
immigration status (and detention and deportation for some); or 2) 
to the extent that it is simply a pretext in cases where law 
enforcement agencies are calling in Border Patrol without 
justification, it is of course a different, but no less pernicious, form of 
discrimination. In either case, the practice violates civil rights 
protections.144 
 
 142 See SARAH CURRY ET AL., THE GROWING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS ALONG WASHINGTON’S 
NORTHERN BORDER (2012), available at https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareone
america.org/files/REPORT_northernborder-FINAL.pdf; LISA GRAYBILL, BORDER PATROL 
AGENTS AS INTERPRETERS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER: UNWISE POLICY, ILLEGAL PRACTICE 
(2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/borderpatrolagents
asinterpreters.pdf. 
 143 See Draft Memorandum from Tamara Kessler for Audrey Anderson, in 8/22/2012 DHS 
CRCL FOIA RESPONSE, supra note 130, at 10. 
 144 Letter from Jorge Barón, Executive Director, Northwestern Immigrant Rights Project, 
Elizabeth Hawkins, Attorney, Bean Porter Hawkins PLLC, and Wendy Hernandez, Attorney, 
Hernandez Immigration Law, to Eric Holder, Attorney General, and Janet Napolitano, DHS 
Secretary 8 (May 1, 2012), available at http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/ComplaintTo
USDOJandDHSreInterpretationAssistanceFinalRedacted05-01-2012.pdf. See also id. at 2: 
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The May 1 complaint sought intervention by the Department of 
Justice, whose Civil Rights Division coordinates Title VI and Executive 
Order 13166 enforcement across the government, and whose Office of 
Justice Programs has the lead role in Title VI enforcement involving law 
enforcement agencies that have received funding from the Department 
of Justice. The complaint requested two DOJ statements: the first, to 
local law enforcement and the second to federal law enforcement, that 
use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters violates Title VI and 
Executive Order 13166 obligations, respectively. In addition, NWIRP 
asked DHS to terminate removal proceedings for anyone facing 
immigration consequences as a result of a request for interpretation by 
Border Patrol agents. 
The USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights issued 
a formal finding against the U.S. Forest Service on May 31, 2012, 
declaring, after comprehensive analysis, that Forest Service use of 
Border Patrol agents to provide interpretation services constituted 
national origin discrimination and also that the language access issue 
was being used was a pretext for discrimination against Latinos. Over 
the evident opposition of the Forest Service, the Final Agency Decision 
closed with an “Order of Relief,” which included an instruction to the 
Forest Service to develop a language access plan that relied on neutral 
interpreters, not Border Patrol agents.145 This order went much further 
than the hypothetical Border Patrol guidance discussed within DHS 
nearly a year before; that was described in the FOIA’d e-mail as 
guidance about “avoiding harm to community 
policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language 
interpretation” whereas the USDA order simply banned, altogether, 
language assistance coordination with Border Patrol. 
This episode highlights, in particular, the cross-agency dynamics 
involved in the work of an Office of Goodness. The USDA’s finding of 
discrimination was an important victory for the advocacy groups, 
ratifying their legal approach to the Border Patrol interpretation issue. 
But they still did not have what they really wanted, because the USDA 
decision covered only the Forest Service. To cover state and local law 
enforcement calls to Border Patrol would require either an authoritative 
 
[A]s the Border Patrol agents are preparing to depart, the WSP trooper thanks them 
and has the following exchange with the agents: 
• WSP Trooper: “Well, I appreciate you coming out.” 
• BP Agent: “No problem, give us a call anytime.” 
• WSP Trooper: “Oh yeah, well, we like to, we just have to do it in a roundabout 
sort of way.” 
• BP Agent: “That’s fine, that’s great, we have no problem with that. We 
appreciate the calls.” 
 145 [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, supra note 122, at 35. 
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ruling by the Department of Justice (governing the obligations of these 
federally supported agencies) or a policy change by the Border Patrol. It 
took another six months, but on November 21, 2012, CBP promulgated 
“Guidance on Providing Language Assistance to Other Law 
Enforcement Organizations,” which instructed Border Patrol offices not 
to agree to requests from non-DHS law enforcement agencies seeking 
“CBP assistance based solely on a need for language translation.” 
Instead, “absent any other circumstances, those requests should be 
referred” to interpreters.146 The policy was distributed to relevant 
groups—including NWIRP—about two weeks later.147 
Training. Finally, once the policy was announced, CRCL did 
outreach to affected local law enforcement agencies, offering them 
materials148 and training about alternatives to their prior reliance on 
Border Patrol for language assistance.149 I surmise that these activities 
assisted Border Patrol in its need to preserve good relations with local 
law enforcement, in part by improving local capacity but in part by 
suggesting that the denial of language assistance was attributable not to 
Border Patrol’s own preferences but because of civil rights imperatives. 
D.     The NCTC AG Guidelines 
On March 22, 2012, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence announced a major change to federal information sharing 
policy. New guidelines replaced rules announced in 2008, and now 
permit the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to obtain and 
retain large federal governmental datasets that contain mostly non-
terrorism information about U.S. citizens for up to five years, in order to 
facilitate repeated “pattern-based” computer queries and analysis 
designed to identify terrorism information. It is up to each federal 
agency from which NCTC requests databases to negotiate terms—
including whether a shorter time frame is appropriate. Previously 
NCTC was allowed to hold onto these kinds of datasets only for 180 
days—enough time to process the data, but not to simply put it into 
 
 146 Memorandum from David V. Aguilar, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=1233. 
 147 Press Release, Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, Border Patrol Policy Change 
Important Victory for Border Communities (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.nwirp.org/
news/viewmediarelease/49. 
 148 See LEP RESOURCE GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, DHS CRCL, available at www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/lep-resouce-guide-law-enforcement_0.pdf. 
 149 See CRCL Provides Language Access Technical Assistance to Law Enforcement (February 
2013), DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 15, 2013), www.dhs.gov/crcl-provides-language-access-
technical-assistance-law-enforcement. 
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storage on the chance that it might later prove useful. In addition, the 
prior permitted uses of pattern analysis were narrower.150 
This all sounds technical but is actually not. As far as public 
information indicated, the new guidelines constituted a sea change in 
federal governmental surveillance of U.S. residents and citizens. Just 
about everything any part of the federal government knows about 
anyone is now potentially available for five years of big-data-mining by 
federal counterterrorism authorities. (We know now that similar data-
ingestion and data-mining techniques were being used by other 
agencies, too,151 but that information became public much later, and is 
beyond this Article’s purview.) Yet although privacy advocates and 
bloggers tried to fan the flames, public response to the NCTC AG 
guidelines change was short lived. The New York Times ran a front page 
story, devoting some space to the “civil-liberties concerns among 
privacy advocates.”152 But those concerns somehow didn’t catch on. 
Blog posts like “The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared 
All of Us Domestic Terrorists”153 got little traction. Civil liberties usually 
have a limited constituency,154 and with so little to gain, politically, 
perhaps Democrats in Congress were reluctant to make this an issue on 
 
 150 For a defense of the new rules in civil liberties terms, see OFFICE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
CIVIL LIBERTIES & PRIVACY OFFICE, INFORMATION PAPER: DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS INCORPORATED IN THE UPDATED NCTC GUIDELINES (2013), available at 
nctc.gov/docs/CLPO_Information_Paper_on_NCTC_AG_Guidelines_-_1-22-13.pdf. 
 151 See Charlie Savage, Broader Sifting Of Message Data By N.S.A. Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2013, at A1; Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Senate Panel Presses N.S.A. on Phone Logs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04
497_story.html; Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing 
Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/us-surveillance-architecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-meta
data/2013/06/15/e9bf004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html; Ellen Nakashima et al., New 
Documents Reveal Parameters of NSA’s Secret Surveillance Programs, WASH. POST (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-documents-reveal-parameters-of-
nsas-secret-surveillance-programs/2013/06/20/54248600-d9f7-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_
story.html; see also In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 2013), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-
130715.pdf. 
 152 Charlie Savage, U.S. Relaxes Limits on Use of Data in Terror Analysis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2012, at A1. 
 153 Marcy Wheeler, The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared All of Us Domestic 
Terrorists, EMPTYWHEEL (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/03/23/the-national-
counterterrorism-center-just-declared-all-of-us-domestic-terrorists. 
 154 See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 72–82 (2011) (discussing the low level of “voter attention to the 
bureaucratic details of intelligence agencies”, and finding that “intelligence has fewer and weaker 
interest groups than almost any other policy area”). 
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which they would fight the Administration.155 (Subsequent revelations 
about the NSA have at least temporarily changed this political calculus.) 
Working groups. Nine months after the NCTC guidelines were 
issued, a story in the Wall Street Journal by investigative reporter Julia 
Angwin revealed a much more sustained record of dissent within the 
government. Based on both reporting and FOIA’d documents, which 
she posted publically, Angwin’s story revealed that CRCL and the DHS 
Privacy Office had opposed the eventually adopted changes over the 
course of a full year. The documents include staff e-mails starting 
February 2011 discussing recommended language, talking points, and 
briefing memos. The discussions and work was conducted via a working 
group, denominated the “Internal Records Working Group,”156 or 
occasionally “DHS/NCTC Records Working Group.”157 It evidently 
including staff from numerous DHS offices—the Office of Intelligence 
& Analysis, Privacy, CRCL, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office 
of Policy, and relevant operational components.158 It seems that the 
working group was able to develop one shared DHS set of suggestions 
about the NCTC guidelines.159 But these met with substantial resistance 
outside DHS; one e-mail to a senior DHS lawyer from counsel’s office at 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) states: “We 
certainly value the input. However, from our review, several of the 
comments tend to suggest a potential lack of understanding as to the 
overarching intent of the Guidelines. Furthermore, some of the edits 
you have proposed would eviscerate the authorities of the DNI and 
NCTC.”160 Staff discussions were then held between staff from DHS, 
ODNI, and the Department of Justice,161 but the results are not 
disclosed in the released materials. 
Advice. By late spring 2011, the issues were being discussed, 
repeatedly, at the agency leadership level rather than only by staff. A 
(redacted) May 12, 2011 memo to the Secretary from me, as CRCL’s 
head, and from DHS Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, is titled 
 
 155 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). 
 156 See, e.g., E-mail from an Intelligence Operations Specialist at the Office of Intelligence & 
Analysis to Rebecca Richards and Others (Feb. 29, 2012), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE 43, 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/526365-dhs-interim-responsecontent.html#
document/p347/a83505 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 157 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (May 12, 2011, 12:52 PM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 148. 
 158 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 55. 
 159 Id. See also E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:08 AM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 439 (proposing “harmonizing CRCL and OGC’s language to 
something both offices can get behind”). 
 160 See, e.g., E-mail from Matthew Kronisch to Mary Ellen Callahan & Margo Schlanger (Mar. 
11, 2011, 2:44 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 47. 
 161 Id. 
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(clunkily, I regret) “How Best to Express the Department’s Privacy and 
Civil Liberties-Related Concerns over Draft Guidelines Proposed by the 
Office of The Director of National Intelligence and the National 
Counterterrorism Center.”162 Disagreement continued in subsequent 
weeks and months. For example, e-mails between a member of the 
Secretary’s staff and Callahan note that Callahan “non concurred on 
operational examples” evidently included in some document, because, 
she explained, “they were complete non sequiturs, non-responsive, and 
did not demonstrate the underlying issues.”163 The Secretary’s 
involvement in the discussion is confirmed at several other points, as 
well.164 
By this time, the dispute was solidly multi-agency (or, as they say in 
the federal intelligence world, “in the interagency”). And although there 
is no public documentation confirming the point, Angwin reported that 
Nancy Libin, the political appointee head of the Justice Department 
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties—the DOJ’s analogous Office of 
Goodness—was likewise counseling against expansion of NCTC big-
data authority.165 Angwin explained that that the proposed change had 
been prompted by the Northwest Flight 253 “underwear bomber,” 
Umar Abdulmutallab, who tried but failed to bring down a Detroit-
bound airplane on Christmas day 2009. Angwin summarized that at 
both DOJ and at DHS, privacy and civil liberties officials “argued that 
the failure to catch Mr. Abdulmutallab wasn’t caused by the lack of a 
suspect—he had already been flagged—but by a failure to investigate 
him fully. So amassing more data about innocent people wasn’t 
necessarily the right solution.”166 And the argument did not die: after 
months of negotiations between DHS and NCTC, in November 2011 
the civil liberties/privacy issues were revived within DHS by the CRCL 
and the Privacy Office with a new memo described as likely to set off a 
“firestorm.”167 The two offices prepared talking points for the DHS 
 
 162 Memo from Margo Schlanger, CRCL Officer, and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy 
Officer, for Sec’y Janet Napolitano (May 12, 2011), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 
347. 
 163 E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to John Cohen (June 17, 2011, 9:52 AM), in DHS 
INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 252. 
 164 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (June 1, 2011, 2:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 212 (referencing an “‘information sharing’ S1 meeting” (“S1” means 
Secretary)); E-mail from [redacted] to Ken Hunt (July 28, 2011, 9:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM 
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 283 (referencing “another S1 meeting coming up”). Additional 
information on the meeting can be found on pp. 255–65. 
 165 See Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast Database of Citizens, WALL. ST. J. 
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873244783045781716230
40640006 (“At the Department of Justice, Chief Privacy Officer Nancy Libin raised concerns 
about whether the guidelines could unfairly target innocent people.”). 
 166 Id. 
 167 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger to Mary Ellen Callahan (Nov. 9, 2011, 9:01 PM), in DHS 
INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 447 (“I’m not sure I’m prepared [for] the firestorm we’re 
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Deputy Secretary for a March 2012 Deputies Committee168 meeting at 
the White House. The Wall Street Journal reports that Callahan was told 
to make her case at that meeting,169 but to no avail. The new rules were 
signed a few days later. 
 
* * * 
 
The four vignettes above provide the foundation for some more 
general thinking about Offices of Goodness. In Part III, I canvass the 
tools available to them and how each one works. 
III.     TOOLS AVAILABLE TO OFFICES OF GOODNESS 
Tools available to Offices of Goodness range along several 
dimensions: from the less to more coercive; from the less to more 
systemic; from the preventive to responsive; and from the internal to 
external. The list below is informed by the four controversies just 
described. It is worth noting that because DHS is itself such a new 
agency, all four controversies come from early in the agency and office 
lifespan; office maturation no doubt affects the dynamics and tools in 
some ways that merit additional investigation. 
A.     Preventive Tools 
Offices of Goodness have a variety of processes they can use to try 
to prevent or ameliorate agency operations that conflict with Goodness. 
Here I analyze four of those methods: inclusion in policy formulation 
working groups; clearance; advice; and training and technical assistance. 
Each of these tools can be used in a reactive context as well, to attempt 
to reduce or respond to a demonstrated problem. 
 
about to create.”); E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to Margo Schlanger (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:22 
PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 446 (“I don’t know that we are ever going to 
get consensus on this from the other signatories, but we have the dep sec instructions.”). 
 168 The Deputies Committee is the most senior sub-cabinet meeting in the Executive Branch, 
bringing together the Deputy Secretaries of the national security agencies. See NATIONAL 
SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1 [“NSPD-1”], ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
COUNCIL SYSTEM (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. 
 169 See Angwin, supra note 165. 
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1.     Inclusion in Working Groups 
Like any bureaucratic organizations, federal agencies bring people 
together to work on projects. One important way that an Office of 
Goodness can represent Goodness is by participating in such a working 
group.170 There are both risks and benefits to this approach. The risk is 
erosion of value commitment as the Office of Goodness staff is carried 
along by the imperatives of whatever the working group’s project is—a 
risk that is particularly strong if a conflict between the project and 
Goodness cannot be reconciled with technocratic adjustment or minor 
tweaks but rather requires some degree of sacrifice of project efficacy. 
The benefit is inclusion of Goodness in group discussions as the project 
develops, which can lead to various types of accommodations and 
changes.171 Even if the group discussions end in impasse, full inclusion 
of the Office of Goodness staff can (though it need not) mean that the 
conflict is highlighted and explained to bureaucratic higher-ups, 
enabling those more senior officials to either fight it out or resolve it 
some other way. The NCTC AG Guidelines incident described above 
provides an example; the working group negotiations described in the 
disclosed documents leading to, first, principals-level discussion at DHS 
and, eventually a Deputies Committee resolution, albeit one rejecting 
the position of DHS’s CRCL and Privacy Office. 
2.     Clearance Authority 
Bureaucracies produce documents, and a common control device 
is a requirement of “coordination” prior to finalization of those 
documents.172 But as Pressman and Wildavsky observed in their classic 
study of government policy implementation, “Telling another person to 
coordinate . . . does not tell him what to do. He does not know whether 
to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure consent.”173 A clearance 
 
 170 For in-depth analysis of working groups in another agency and another context, see, for 
example, McGarity, supra note 29. 
 171 See, e.g., Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 18–21 (describing lawyers’ 
“integration with officers and troops on the battlefield as essential to their ability to inject legal 
norms and values into the decision-making process”). 
 172 See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 49 (1977) 
(“Increased participation in governmental decisions by external groups is matched by procedures 
to make sure that every administrative unit inside the government also contributes its special 
knowledge, point of view, and sympathy for its clientele to the final product. One method is 
compulsory clearance of pending decisions with every relevant organizational unit whose 
jurisdiction touches on the matters under consideration.”). 
 173 JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT 
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S AMAZING THAT 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
94 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:53 
 
requirement is one specific environment for this issue; clearance 
requirements can be more or less coercive. On the most coercive end, an 
Office of Goodness could have the ability simply to bar promulgation of 
a document. Such authority is usually, however, a hallmark of chain-of-
command superiority—something not available to Offices of Goodness, 
as I have described them. While the agency-head can, of course, decline 
to issue (or deny permission to issue) a document, one government 
office ordinarily cannot authoritatively stop the issuance of a document 
by its sibling office. Still, it is possible to give an office assigned a 
clearance role something very close to that power, by structuring the 
conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that 
needs to “appeal” a clearance denial. This is what is described in the 
account above about DHS and Occupy. If the DHS Office of Intelligence 
& Analysis disagreed with the considered refusal of CRCL, Privacy, or 
the DHS Office of the General Counsel to clear an intelligence product, 
the burden was on Intelligence & Analysis to persuade the Deputy 
Secretary that it should be able to issue the product. This description 
suggests what is, analytically, one step lower in terms of coercion: a 
clearance process can allow the objecting office a chance to appeal. Least 
coercive is a simple coordination requirement, in which the Office of 
Goodness is merely offered a chance to attempt to persuade, but no 
other authority. Regardless of the impact on the document subjected to 
clearance, even the softest of clearance requirements ensures that each 
office asked to clear is kept informed of what is going on at other 
government offices, which has its own benefits. 
3.     Advice 
Both working groups and clearance arrangements are ways of 
structuring advice given by staff to agency decisionmakers. An 
important tool for any Office of Goodness is the opportunity to give 
advice even in the absence of such structures. Advice-giving, both in 
writing and at meetings, is a key part of the NCTC account above. And 
CRCL’s advice to Border Patrol about interpretation issues is part of 
that story, too. Advice-giving can operate in several ways. Office of 
Goodness advisors can spot or highlight issues that might otherwise be 
insufficiently noticed or valued. They can advocate and perhaps 
persuade decisionmakers about a particular position.174 If their advice is 
 
ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A 
FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 134 (1973). 
 174 Cf. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 95 (2014) (exploring situations in which principal may rationally prefer the agent’s 
zeal to exceed the principal’s). 
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known or discoverable, they can increase the political cost of taking a 
contrary position, because the decisionmaker’s choice to overrule their 
objection may become public. On the other hand, if Office of Goodness 
advice ratifies rather than challenges agency policy, then it can both 
reassure decisionmakers and reduce the potential political cost of that 
policy, by providing a ready answer to objectors (“We ran this by the 
Office of Goodness, and it signed off”).175 Of course this last point 
provides some leverage for the Office to induce alterations in exchange 
for ratification.176 
4.     Training and Technical Assistance 
Training is often the first response of an organization faced with a 
compliance problem. Work about equal employment opportunity 
training suggests that several reasons for its preferred status. 
Implementation of a training program allows an organization to signal 
its Goodness. In addition, because training looks at inputs, not 
outcomes, it is easy to measure and success is very attainable. Moreover, 
a training remedy for a Goodness problem supports a cognitively 
attractive story of ignorance rather than malicious non-compliance. 
None of these rationales turn much on efficacy, and indeed, diversity 
and anti-harassment training, for example, are very widespread even 
though they do not generally seem to promote race or gender 
integration in the workplace or reduce the prevalence of workplace 
harassment.177 But the account of the Occupy issue, above, demonstrates 
that training works in other ways as well. While moderate amounts of 
workplace training are unlikely to produce experts in any complicated 
field, training by Office of Goodness staff can alert the trainees about 
“warning flags,” so that they know to seek assistance when such an issue 
arises. In-house training also exposes the trainees to the office 
 
 175 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193 
(2012) (analyzing reasons to delegate a decision to a person or entity that does not share the 
delegator’s views). 
 176 Scholars have sketched similar dynamics in discussions of presidential advice-giving by the 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency 
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1210 (2013) (“Approval from a (partially) independent 
gatekeeper of executive legality gives the White House political credibility and legitimacy when 
OLC approves, and the price of such credibility and legitimacy is that OLC must also have the 
power to disapprove. Relatedly, conditional on OLC already being in place, a public disclosure 
that the White House had pressured or bypassed OLC might supply a focal point that would 
trigger investigations by legislators or by Inspectors General, or even condemnation by broad 
public opinion, at least in a highly salient case.”). 
 177 See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction 
of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007); Alexandra Kalev, Frank 
Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity Management and the Remediation 
of Inequality, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589 (2006). 
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performing the training, ratifying that office as expert and respected, 
and placing it in the personal networks of those trained. Finally, training 
and technical assistance allow an Office of Goodness to offer a service to 
another office in its agency, keeping the relationship from being 
uniformly conflictual. 
B.     Responsive Tools 
Additional tools respond to practices already underway that may 
conflict with Goodness. Here I treat two methods—program or 
operational review, and investigation of individual or systemic 
problems. 
1.     Program or Operational Review 
The laptop search impact assessment described above is a species of 
program review.178 So too is the demographic data analysis adopted as a 
result of that review. Program review is a broad genus, covering 
examination of all types of policy, policy implementation, and practices. 
A few observations follow: 
First, it seems likely that the dynamics of these sorts of reviews will 
often depend on whether they are deemed special or routine. A review 
that is special usually begins with some kind of trigger, which frames the 
expectations about the review by suggesting that a problem may well 
exist, and therefore makes it less aggressive for the Office of Goodness 
to, in the event, find a problem. In addition, special reviews are more 
likely to receive a great deal of time, effort, and attention, where such 
resources are harder to muster for routine reviews.179 
Second, the public or non-public nature of a review is important, 
but the effects of the choice are complicated. If a review is public, it 
 
 178 On impact assessments in particular, see, e.g., KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 49; 
SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, 
supra note 6. On internal program reviews (or evaluations) that serve general conceptions of 
effectiveness, see, e.g., RICHARD C. SONNICHSEN, HIGH IMPACT INTERNAL EVALUATION: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO EVALUATING AND CONSULTING INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS (1999) 
(generalizing from author’s FBI experience); Richard C. Sonnichsen, Advocacy Evaluation: A 
Strategy for Organizational Improvement, 10 SCI. COMM. 243 (1989) (describing “advocacy 
evaluation” inside the FBI). 
 179 Cf. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA 
152 (1980) (“In the immediate aftermath of the intelligence scandals, anyone in the Justice 
Department assigned the task of reviewing an FBI domestic intelligence investigation will 
naturally take it seriously. But inevitably, if the task is an additional duty for those who must 
undertake it, it may become devalued to a quick look and a routine ‘sign off.’”). 
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functions as “a threat and a means for inviting external oversight.”180 
That means that the Office of Goodness is bound to receive much more 
pressure from other agency offices to make the review relatively gentle—
but the office whose program is under review is also under much more 
pressure to accede to recommendations. As Mark Moore and Jane Gates 
wrote about Inspectors General, 
[I]t . . . seems clear that the effectiveness of IGs is greatest when they 
can operate with the implicit threat of publicity and congressional 
attention rather than its reality. When an issue escalates, there is a 
real risk that program managers will dig in their heels, frustrating 
implementation of proposed changes.181 
Inspectors General have final authority over their reports, which allows 
this threat to be a realistic one. A crucial question arises whether the 
Office of Goodness has the authority to override suggestions as to the 
content of a report that is public, or whether, instead, the report itself is 
subject to some kind of fairly coercive clearance process.182 If there is a 
coercive clearance process for a public report, one can expect that 
process to exert potentially irresistible pressure to soften its content. As 
for a non-public report, unless (like the USDA civil rights office) an 
Office of Goodness has final or near-final authority not just to make 
recommendations but to insist that they be carried out, a non-public 
report may be plainer spoken but is likely to be at least somewhat less 
influential. Without anticipated public exposure of at least some 
summary of findings and recommendations, there is less reason for 
disagreeing operational offices to accede to a program review’s 
recommendations. At that point, the Office of Goodness’s goal has to be 
to persuade an authoritative decisionmaker, such as the agency’s 
Secretary, to resolve an intraorganizational dispute in its favor—an 
unattractive position to put the Secretary in, and in any event, one that 
requires the Office of Goodness to make a large expenditure of 
organizational capital. 
Third, unless an Office of Goodness possesses sufficient influence 
that it need not care about maintaining collegial relations within its 
agency, a program review is likely to be perceived as much more 
legitimate if it is undertaken at the request of some important 
stakeholder or principal (Congress or the Secretary, for example), or 
based on some objective feature of the situation (say, a death). Of course 
an Office of Goodness can affirmatively seek an assignment by an 
 
 180 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 98. 
 181 MOORE & GATES, supra note 6, at 73. 
 182 See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 98 (“[D]uring her 
tenure Kelly successfully prevented DHS or the White House from exercising editorial control 
over reports issued by her office or privacy impact assessments, although her annual report did go 
through a review.”); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
98 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:53 
 
agency principal to conduct a review, if its leaders believe such a review 
would prove useful. But without that assignment—which is to say, 
without acknowledgement of a potential problem by an authority 
outside the Office—assertion of autonomy to review extant operational 
policies or practices is likely to be seen internally as at least power-
grabbing and possibly illegitimate. 
2.     Complaint Investigation 
What makes an investigation different from a program review is 
that investigations look (at least initially) at particular facts and results, 
examining the effects of some program, activity, or conduct on an 
individual or individuals. The description above of the Border Patrol 
interpretation issue illustrates the dynamics of an Office of Goodness 
investigation, performed by USDA’s highly empowered civil rights 
office. 
Many offices within government agencies do internal 
investigations. To name just a few, Inspector Generals’ offices explore 
the possibility of criminal charges being brought;183 ethics offices and 
offices of professional responsibility consider the possibility of various 
types of professional discipline; security offices investigate security 
breaches. The purpose of an Office of Goodness complaint system is 
often more prospective. As Kaufman wrote about ombudsman’s offices, 
[i]f the ombudsman finds merit in a complaint, the expectation is 
that the accused agency will normally accede to his finding and 
redress the grievance as he recommends . . . . The complainant, in 
short, would enjoy the services of a well-equipped champion whose 
resources would be comparable to those of other parts of the 
bureaucracy, a champion whose performance was measured by 
triumphs over bureaucratic adversaries.184 
At DHS, because CRCL lacks authority either to prosecute or to 
discipline, individual wrongdoing is largely left to those other offices 
that have such authority. (Other Offices of Goodness in other agencies 
may possess the authority to investigate and sanction.185) And because 
CRCL mostly lacks authority to provide individual remedies, that too, is 
left to different systems.186 Instead, CRCL uses complaint investigations 
as a foundation for the same sorts of more systematic recommendations 
 
 183 IGs offices do many other types of reviews as well. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 184 KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 95–96. 
 185 See Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 24–25. 
 186 For example, administrative claims may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
Note that CRCL’s authority is broader for disability rights complaints brought under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 15. 
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that might come out of a program review.187 This is evidently similar to 
the approach taken by USDA’s civil rights office to its Border Patrol 
interpretation investigation, described above. 
Why have Offices of Goodness investigations, then? Several 
reasons seem important. Investigation authority means that an Office of 
Goodness can conduct a targeted program review without being accused 
of self-aggrandizement—the agenda is set by complaints, not by the 
Office itself. In addition, becoming a regular recipient of complaints 
opens a window for the Office into agency operations and their impacts. 
This is particularly true if the complaint process is constructed to 
facilitate tracking of large numbers of complaints. (Recall that one of the 
recommendations adopted as a result of CRCL’s Electronic Device 
Searching Impact Assessment was modification of the check-off options 
for traveler complaints, to include complaints about allegedly abusive 
searches and interviews, allowing much easier monitoring of the issue 
over time.) And correspondingly, authority to conduct investigations 
premised on complaints allows an Office of Goodness to offer a service 
to the external advocacy and community groups whose support I argue 
in Part IV it needs to maintain effectiveness. 
Whatever type of investigation or review is available to it, it does 
seem that an Office of Goodness needs some way to get beyond the 
information affirmatively provided by other agency offices: de facto or 
de jure inability to demand a response to questions and production of 
documents would considerably shrink the Office’s abilities.188 
C.     Boundary-Spanning Tools 
I have mentioned several times above the interaction between an 
Office of Goodness and those outside its agency who share a 
commitment to its assigned value, Goodness. The relationship between 
the office and those external constituencies requires care and feeding. 
The tools discussed here are outreach, document generation, and 
congressional reporting. 
 
 187 See FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2010 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2009.pdf. 
 188 See Mary Ellen Callahan, For Federal Privacy Programs, the Final Fair Information Practice 
Principle Is Crucial, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 28, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/
a/for-federal-privacy-programs-the-final-fair-information-practice-principle (“The lack of 
investigatory or enforcement authority among other federal Chief Privacy Officers diminishes 
their ability to address thorny privacy policy issues and violations. The incentives to admit fault or 
face consequences are shifted, and the privacy officers cannot force a response or production of 
documents.”). 
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1.     Outreach 
A crucial aspect of Office of Goodness operations is boundary 
spanning189—maintaining connections to external constituencies of 
Goodness. Each Office of Goodness offers an obvious organizational 
entry point to stakeholders that share its assigned value. As discussed in 
the next section, secure connections are also vital to maintaining the 
Office’s commitment to its assigned value. But even apart from that, 
where these connections are secure and effective, they offer the Office of 
Goodness information about problems, ideas about solutions, political 
support in the Congress, and public back-up for contested positions 
taken inside the agency. The “groups,” as non-profit advocacy 
organizations are sometimes called in Washington, can do many things 
not easily available to a government office, from talking to the press, to 
pressing an issue with a sympathetic congressional staffer, to an 
organized protest. It is obviously better for an Office of Goodness if such 
moves are supportive, rather than adverse to its own existence and its 
preferred outcomes. In addition, one of the Office’s claims to influence 
within an agency is its ability to predict what steps will and will not 
provoke controversy from groups that share its value. 
So all things point Offices of Goodness towards robust engagement 
with organizations dedicated to Goodness, by meeting and other 
methods. The Border Patrol interpretation section, above, demonstrates 
some of the dynamics, as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and 
others reached out to CRCL, and CRCL reported these groups’ concerns 
to Border Patrol and named those concerns as one reason to issue new 
policy. 
2.     Document Generation 
Each Office of Goodness strategy produces documents, which may 
set out a problem, finding, or solution. Those documents are a key part 
of Office output.190 They may be disclosed automatically or on request 
 
 189 On the role and stresses of boundary-spanners in complex organizations, see, for example, 
W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203–13 (5th ed. 
2003); Howard Aldrich & Diane Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217 (1977); Howard Aldrich, Organizational Boundaries and Inter-
organizational Relations, 24 HUM. REL. 279 (1971); Robert E. Spekman, Influence and 
Information: An Exploratory Investigation of the Boundary Role Person’s Basis of Power, 22 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 104 (1979). 
 190 Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law 
Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013). 
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by, say, Congress, or under FOIA.191 Or, theoretically,192 they could be 
leaked. However they get out, they are fodder for external organizations 
and constituencies—particularly when the documentation supports 
those organizations’ views. For example, the documentation of CRCL’s 
nonconcurrence with the release of the Right-Wing Extremism paper 
bolstered the views of external organizations and stakeholders that the 
paper was problematic. And it provided them with a talking point (“An 
office inside DHS agrees that . . . ”). Even if an Office’s conclusions do 
not accord with the external users’ views, if the Office does a competent 
job gathering and analyzing the situation, the resulting information can 
be highly useful to external actors, contributing to what Seth Kreimer 
names the “ecology of transparency.”193 
3.     Congressional Reporting 
As described in Part I’s discussion of CRCL’s statutory authorities, 
Congress typically requires Offices of Goodness to include in their 
annual or other congressional reports information that is either of 
interest to members of Congress or to their constituencies. Indeed, it 
would be odd for Congress to omit such a requirement, which allows 
Offices of Goodness to improve congressional oversight capacity. 
Placing a monitor inside the agency and instructing that monitor to 
report back in the event of a problem is a variant of the “fire-alarm” 
oversight strategy named (and analyzed most famously) by political 
scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz.194 The strategy 
has pros and cons, from Congress’s perspective. An Office of Goodness 
has internal access, which improves the penetration of the fire-alarm 
system beyond what can be expected of, say, an advocacy organization. 
On the other hand, an Office of Goodness is subject to much more 
pressure than one of the outside advocacy groups to minimize or fail to 
report its colleagues’ problems.195 In addition, congressional reporting 
depends on the Office maintaining at least sufficient influence to both 
 
 191 For a discussion of the development of FOIA as an accountability tool after the 9/11 
attacks, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 112–21; Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information 
Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011 (2008). 
 192 I am not aware of any leaks from CRCL, but of course it’s possible. 
 193 See Kreimer, supra note 191. 
 194 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
 195 Perhaps this is why some of the Intelligence Community’s Civil Liberties Offices issue 
congressional reports so opaque as to be useless as fire alarms. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF. PRIVACY & 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICE, REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2013, OCTOBER 1, 2012 THROUGH 
DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 2 (2013), available at http://dpclo.defense.gov/Portals/49/Documents/
Privacy/FY13QTR1.pdf (listing number of complaints by relevant constitutional amendment, and 
reporting only that some are pending, and some have been reviewed). 
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find out about problems, and at least sufficient autonomy or authority 
to report about them. Occasionally a bureaucratic arm-wrestle breaks 
out over precisely this issue, when an Office wishes to report more 
candidly than its agency would prefer. One episode at DHS involving 
the Privacy Office led to the enactment of two statutes purporting to 
forbid DHS or OMB editing of that office’s annual report, a result OLC 
opined was unconstitutional; DHS informed Congress it would not be 
enforcing the statute.196 But even in less contentious situations, Offices 
interested in having an impact are well advised to see congressional 
reporting not just as a chore but an opportunity for influence.197 
The prior paragraph deals with the impact of congressional 
reporting after the fact. But congressional reporting requirements have 
dynamic effects, too. If Congress requires an Office of Goodness to 
publish both its recommendations and its agency’s response to them, 
that simultaneously magnifies pressure on both the agency and on the 
Office, particularly if congressional committees or staff are believed to 
monitor the reports, and potentially follow up with letters, requests for 
briefings, or hearings. Public disclosure and the possibility the agency 
might be called to account increases the stature of the Office’s 
recommendations and the likelihood of concurrence. But it also 
imposes pressure on the Office to soft pedal and thereby keep 
disagreements in the family. The point is that congressional reporting is 
double edged in just the same way described above with respect to 
program reviews. 
 
* * * 
 
The tools just described—and the list might be supplemented 
somewhat based on other case studies—can only affect what occurs 
within an Office of Goodness’s agency if others in that agency care 
about the Office’s views and if those views are sometimes different from 
 
 196 In 2007, Congress mandated in its annual appropriations bill that that no appropriated 
funds be used by anyone outside the Privacy Office to alter or delay the Office’s annual 
congressional report. Similar restrictions were included in the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, supra note 42, at § 802(e)(1) (DHS’s Chief Privacy Officer 
shall “submit reports directly to the Congress . . . without any prior comment or amendment by 
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other officer or employee of the Department or the Office 
of Management and Budget.” For the OLC opinion rejecting this statutory provision as 
unconstitutional, see STEVEN G. BRADBURY, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIRECT REPORTING 
REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 802(E)(1) OF THE IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/privacy-officer-
report.pdf. 
 197 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 97–98 (describing the 
DHS privacy office: “Kelly framed her office’s direct-congressional-reporting function as both a 
right and an obligation, and emphasized the function’s importance as a signal of structural 
independence”). 
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those of other agency staff. These prerequisites for Office of Goodness 
effectiveness are the subject of the next part. 
IV.     WHAT DO OFFICES OF GOODNESS NEED? 
Offices of Goodness cannot increase the amount of Goodness in an 
agency without two capacities: influence and commitment. That is, 
Office staff must know about and be able to affect agency activity, and 
they must wield such influence as they have in furtherance of Goodness, 
their Office’s assigned value. In this part, I argue that both influence and 
commitment depend crucially on external reinforcement.198 It is this 
dependence that protects the Office of Goodness strategy from a charge 
of insularity and self-serving self-regulation. 
The argument begins with the observation that Offices of 
Goodness exist to bring into their agencies not just a value that is not 
primary, but one that constrains or even conflicts with the agency’s 
raison d’etre. For reasons to do with culture, expertise, interest groups, 
and congressional oversight, agencies tend to develop a strong and 
univalent sense of mission. As James Q. Wilson wrote in his classic 
treatment of bureaucracy: 
A sense of mission becomes the basis, explicitly or implicitly, on 
which personnel are recruited, trained, rewarded, and managed. 
Philip Selznick, from whom my views on this matter are so obviously 
derived, has remarked that an organizational mission is not simply 
the formal goal of the organization but the distinctive and valued set 
of behaviors, selected from among a large number of behaviors, by 
which activity toward a goal and organizational maintenance are 
reconciled. Mission, in short, implies much more than the neutral, 
technical term, “means.”199 
 
 198 The account I present is consonant with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, 
Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (describing how factors 
including the increasing influence of privacy advocates and the rise of privacy professionals have 
pushed corporate privacy regimes from the procedural to the substantive), and TAYLOR, supra 
note 178 (highlighting as crucial factors for the success of an internal compliance unit the clarity 
of its goals, its staff’s commitment to those goals, its autonomy, and its external support). Todd 
LaPorte’s work on “high-reliability organizations” provides another useful analogy. See, e.g., Todd 
R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF 
DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99 
(Auerswald et al. eds., 2006) (“Highly reliable operations . . . . are difficult to sustain in the absence 
of external enforcement. Continuous attention both to achieving organizational missions and to 
avoiding serious failures also requires repeated interactions with elements in the external 
environment, not only to ensure resources, but, as importantly, to buttress management resolve 
to maintain the internal relations outlined above and to nurture highly reliable organizations’ 
culture of reliability.”). 
 199 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 14 
(1978). Among Selznick’s relevant work is, for example, SELZNICK, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
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Scholars of bureaucracy and administration have long explained 
that agencies have difficulty simultaneously internalizing a mission and 
its constraints, much less conflicting goals.200 Since the entire point of an 
Office of Goodness is constraint or opposition, this means that every 
Office of Goodness faces continual pressure to slide into disempowered 
irrelevance or to be tamed by capture or assimilation.201 These dangers 
are magnified by the fact that a powerless Office of Goodness is far from 
useless either to its agency or to Congress. Even if everyone inside the 
agency knows that the Office has little or no influence, both the agency 
and the Congress can continue to reap some of the benefits of its 
existence, by claiming, technically accurately, to have an Office 
dedicated to Goodness. Stakeholders, whether in or out of the agency, 
who are less interested in the value Goodness than in seeming to care 
about Goodness may be well served by a neutered Office, to which 
assignments can be made without fear of disruption.202 And 
stakeholders who care more may not be able to detect the Office’s 
fettered circumstances. On the other hand, if an Office truly lacks all 
influence, that fact is bound to get out to some extent, making it an 
unconvincing standard-bearer and therefore fairly useless. So one would 
expect Offices of Goodness to face efforts to limit but not quite 
eliminate their influence. I argue in this Part that Offices will be hard 
pressed to resist such efforts without external reinforcement and 
support. 
Even a powerless Office of Goodness poses some risk to its agency; 
without much influence itself, it may, for example, nonetheless produce 
records able to be used against the agency by more muscular Goodness 
advocates. This prospect can be eliminated by capture or assimilation,203 
 
 200 See, e.g., JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN: 
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES (2d ed. 1996); WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6; Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the 
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005). 
 201 Offices of Goodness may be unwelcome within agencies for other reasons as well. As 
Kaufman wrote, an ombudsman’s office—a species of Office of Goodness—“creates anxieties 
among legislators and administrative agencies already on the scene . . . . Administrative agencies 
wonder what the impact of an ombudsman on their operations would be, particularly since he 
would introduce impediments to crisp decisive action, and perhaps encourage resistance where 
none would otherwise develop.” KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 96. 
 202 See, e.g., JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: 
RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 31 (updated ed., 1991) (“By designing a formal structure that adheres 
to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that 
it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.”). 
 203 Ordinarily, the phrase “regulatory capture” denotes “a situation in which an industry which 
is regulated controls a regulatory agency’s policies.” Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 267 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). In our setting, however, the agency itself is in a role like a regulated entity, and the Office of 
Goodness is akin to a regulator. For a summary of capture theory, see id.; Michael E. Levine & 
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a 
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which I mean to encompass not just personally self-interested behavior, 
but any systematic inclination by Office of Goodness staff to undervalue 
Goodness compared to the agency’s primary mission. (As discussed 
below, the mechanisms of capture may be quite different than in the 
ordinary usage in positive political theory.) Pressures towards capture or 
assimilation are likely to be even stronger than those towards 
impotence. After all, unlike a disempowered Office, a tame Office of 
Goodness can be given the trappings of influence without threat to the 
agency.204 Again, this part’s argument is that resistance to capture can be 
bolstered by a variety of boundary-spanning techniques, to ensure that 
Office staff maintain external Goodness advocates as an important 
reference group. 
A.     Influence 
An Office of Goodness cannot be effective if its staff is frozen out of 
meetings, its advice can be disregarded without consequence, or its 
activities face resource constraints that prevent it from undertaking or 
participating in important projects. Offices of Goodness do not seek 
autonomy (as so many other federal offices do), but they must seek 
influence. As in so many situations in federal agencies, “[t]he principal 
source of power is a constituency.”205 And of course Offices are not the 
passive recipients of constituency support; they can help build support, 
as well as rely on it.206 In addition, Offices of Goodness can gain 
influence from threat, rather than support. As Sallyanne Payton once 
wrote about the analogous context of company doctors, 
external threat can turn an in-house staff professional from a cost 
center into a ‘boundary person’ who is worth the price of the threats 
averted. The question is how to convert the company doctor’s 
legitimate ethical concerns into demands made on the company by 
 
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). For foundational treatments, see, for example, Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard 
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). 
 204 On the analogous issue of “cosmetic compliance” in the corporate law context, see, e.g., 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 205 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 204. 
 206 Many sources analyze the ways in which federal offices build their varied constituencies. 
See, e.g., CARPENTER, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 15; CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND 
POWER, supra note 15; KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER, supra note 15; WILSON, THE 
INVESTIGATORS, supra note 199; Cuéllar, supra note 15. 
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powerful outsiders, thereby allowing company doctors to 
demonstrate their loyalty by helping their companies comply.207 
The important outsiders for federal Offices of Goodness, both in terms 
of support and threat, are Congress, non-governmental groups, other 
agencies, and the White House. Observations on many of the relevant 
dynamics follow: 
Congress, the White House, and the budget. Without sufficient 
resources, the Office will, for example, lack staff. And the tools described 
above can be quite staff intensive.208 Budgetary needs require support to 
satisfy. Like nearly all federal agencies, an Office of Goodness depends 
on the Congress for its budget. And Congress—or at least the members 
of Congress in the President’s party—begin with the administration’s 
budget, submitted by the Office of Management and Budget, within the 
White House. Thus the Office needs support from at least one of the key 
budgetary players—the agency’s budget decisionmaker (who provides a 
proposed budget to OMB), the White House, or someone in the 
Congress. Others have explored the federal budgetary process in 
detail,209 and I will not belabor the point, except to observe that an 
administration’s budgetary requests for Offices of Goodness might well 
require particular scrutiny by the Office’s supporters; various parts of 
the administration might want to starve particular Offices, if they can, 
given the Offices’ watchdog function.210 
Congress and the oversight function. Perhaps less obvious (though 
partially broached above) is Congress’s nonbudgetary role in buttressing 
the influence of Offices of Goodness. As already explained, 
 
 207 Sallyanne Payton, The Company Doctor, by Elaine Draper, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
384, 386–87 (2004) (book review). 
 208 When DHS’s CRCL took on the new task of intelligence product clearance, the 
Administration’s FY 2011 proposed budget sought an additional six staff positions to do the work, 
at a cost of $1.2 million. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, 
FY 2011, at OSEM-23, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_congressional_
budget_justification_fy2011.pdf. This was about 5% of the office’s total budget. The funds were 
not, however, forthcoming. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION, FY 2012, at OSEM-21, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-
congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf. 
 209 The current executive budget process is set out in very great detail in OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND 
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/a11_current_year/a11_2013.pdf. For some discussion of the constraints inherent in 
this process, see Datla & Revesz, supra note 31, at 805–808 (2013). More generally, see, e.g., ALLEN 
SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (1995); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE 
NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1988); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of 
Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998). 
 210 As Richard Pious writes of sub-agency operational bureaus seeking more autonomy, they 
work to ensure that “[d]etailed spending authorizations and specific itemized appropriations [are] 
granted directly to the bureaus in order to prevent the department (or White House) from 
determining the allocation of resources for bureau programs.” RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 232 (1979). 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
2014] OFFICES  OF GOO D NESS  107 
 
congressional reporting is one way Offices of Goodness carry out their 
fire alarm function, alerting Congress to issues members interested in 
Goodness might want to know about. Congressional reporting is 
simultaneously a key tool within the agency, because exposure of an 
Office’s recommendations and the agency’s responses pressures the 
agency to agree to the recommendations (while simultaneously 
pressuring the Office to tone those recommendations down, so that the 
agency’s leaders don’t mind saying yes). The additional point here is 
that congressional reporting’s influence is likely to fade if congressional 
committees, members, or staff do not follow up on at least some of what 
is revealed, whether the follow-up occurs by letter, requests for staff or 
member briefings, committee hearings, or any other of the myriad ways 
in which congressional actors make their views and interests known.211 
White House. The White House has many non-budgetary levers 
that influence what goes on in the agencies. Of course this is true for the 
President and those very close to him. As then-professor Elena Kagan 
summarized in her analysis of “Presidential Administration,”  
[A] President has many resources at hand to influence the scope and 
content of administrative action. Agency officials may accede to his 
preferences because they feel a sense of personal loyalty and 
commitment to him; because they desire his assistance in budgetary, 
legislative, and appointments matters; or in extreme cases because 
they respect and fear his removal power.212 
But, like every other institution in this Article (and with credit for 
the phrase to Ken Shepsle), the White House is a “they,” not an it.213 For 
any Office of Goodness, at least dozens of the many hundreds of staff in 
the Executive Office of the President214 can either support or diminish 
the Office’s influence. White House staff—assigned to the White House 
Counsel’s office, Domestic Policy Council, the National Security Staff, 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the Office of Public 
 
 211 See, e.g., JOEL D. AUERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT (1990); LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); McCubbins & Schwartz, Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, supra 
note 194. 
 212 Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 140, at 2298. 
 213 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). The point is frequently made (though also frequently 
ignored). See, e.g., Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1036 (“Agencies Are a 
‘They,’ Not an ‘It.’ Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, like 
nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1854 (2013) (“Recall that 
while the President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is emphatically a ‘they,’ not an 
‘it.’”). 
 214 See Leadership Library, Executive Office of the President (subscription site, 
http://lo.bvdep.com/OrgDocument.asp?OrgId=-1&LDIBookId=19&LDIOrgId=151861&LDI
SecId=200&FromRecent=1&Save=0#O151861). 
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Engagement, etc.—can function very like congressional staff after a “fire 
alarm” is rung, reaching into the agency with particular vigor if 
something or someone directs their attention to a particular problem. 
White House staff can request or ignore Office views on the resulting 
issues, and can include or exclude Office staff and leadership from the 
resulting meetings. Even though agencies strive to present a united front 
to the White House, involvement in White House meetings and 
discussions is very empowering, validating the importance and 
“equities” (a word used in Washington to mean appropriate role) of the 
offices included and necessitating at least their grudging acquiescence in 
the agency position. If, on the other hand, White House staff excludes or 
gives short shrift to the views of Office staff or leadership, that 
diminishes Office influence within the agency.215 
Other agencies. Offices of Goodness can be shored up or 
undermined by offices in other agencies. As DeShazo and Freeman have 
pointed out, “agencies can be prompted to take their secondary missions 
more seriously when Congress enhances interagency lobbying by 
increasing the power of other agencies, which derive relevant expertise 
and interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the 
implementing agency.”216 Offices of Goodness are, to use this language, 
assigned to a “secondary mission” within their agency. So the kinds of 
efforts DeShazo and Freeman describe, in which agencies influence each 
other by “providing useful information, threatening litigation, or 
threatening to go over the head of the agency to members of Congress 
or higher-ups in the White House”217 all interact with Offices of 
Goodness’ efforts. This is obvious in two of the examples, above, dealing 
with the Border Patrol interpretation issue and the NCTC data ingestion 
and retention guidelines. In the first, the FOIA’d documents evidence 
substantial impact from what DeShazo and Freeman might call 
“lobbying” of DHS by DOJ and USDA. The result was to push DHS 
towards the more civil-rights-friendly policy of restricting Border 
Patrol’s interpretive services offered to non-DHS law enforcement. On 
the other hand, the DHS position in the NCTC data-retention matter, 
which had evidently been agreed to within the Department (including 
by CRCL and the Privacy Office), prior to objections by ODNI, was 
overruled in the interagency process. 
 
 215 Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1058, makes a similar point about 
the intra-agency boost provided by White House access, though tied to the President rather than 
the White House more broadly: “Our hypothesis is that the President has more influence over 
[Executive-created] agencies because those who are closest to the President within these agencies 
are better equipped to overcome their intra-agency opponents. Their access to the superior 
authority of the President will operate as something of a trump card in intra-agency disputes.” 
 216 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 200, at 2221. 
 217 Id. at 2261. 
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The point is not simply that another agency might agree or 
disagree with an Office of Goodness, although as just seen either is 
possible. It is that an Office of Goodness may be able either to call upon 
or to fend off a like-minded part of another agency, increasing its own 
fire-power in the former instance or bolstering its agency’s (highly-
valued) autonomy in the latter. Agreement is not a prerequisite for 
assistance. If, for example, an outside agency understood to be 
committed to Goodness takes a harder stance on some issue than an 
Office of Goodness, that might actually enhance the Office of 
Goodness’s position, making its preferred approach the compromise. 
But less happily for the Office of Goodness, the other agency may 
undermine it in several ways. If the outside agency takes a softer stance 
than the Office of Goodness, that may defeat the Office’s point of view 
in the specific instance and harm the Office’s reputation more generally. 
Or the outside agency’s harder stance, if it wins the day, may damage the 
Office’s influence by rebutting its claim to its agency that following 
Office advice will assist in defending against attacks on the agency’s 
autonomy.218 
Advocacy Groups. As sociologists have explored, for decades 
American corporations have created offices to mirror their regulatory 
environment, putting in place environmental, EEO, and labor relations 
offices, for example.219 Offices of Goodness constitute the equivalent 
strategy for government agencies, mirroring external stakeholder values 
and providing an obvious point of access for advocacy groups interested 
in constraining the agency’s operations. So a key role for many Offices 
of Goodness is to manage the relationship between the agency and the 
advocacy groups that are the agency’s natural opponents, but the 
Office’s natural constituents—to take their phone calls and meetings, 
answer at least some of their questions, and blunt their criticisms. For 
this to work, the Office has to provide the groups with something of 
value.220 That is likely to be information and access, whether via 
 
 218 Cf. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS, supra note 199, at 165 (“In my view, it is the desire for 
autonomy, and not for large budgets, new powers, or additional employees, that is the dominant 
motive of public executives.”). 
 219 See JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL 
AND RATIONALITY (1992); J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY (1967); Paul R. Lawrence & Jay W. Lorsch, Differentiation and 
Integration in Complex Organizations, 12 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1967). 
 220 Of course, leaders in Offices of Goodness may wish to assist advocacy organizations for 
simpler ideological reasons, as well, to increase the organizations’ own stature in service of the 
shared value. Steve Teles explores this point in his account of “transformative bureaucracy,” 
which he describes as activities by political appointees “consciously deploying agency resources to 
transform the terms of political competition in the future,” in part by “assist[ing] the development 
of [chosen] political organizations by providing them direct subsidy, increasing their profile (for 
example, by giving highly-publicized speeches to their members), and by granting them preferred 
access to agency decision making.” Steven Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers 
and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 62 (Apr. 2009). 
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informational meetings or by producing reports and documents that 
advocates can in turn use. Other possibilities include a complaint 
process, which might produce individual or policy remedies for 
problems, or at the least, serve process values. Advocacy groups hope for 
more, of course; what they really want is that that Offices informed by 
their concerns and analysis may be able to accomplish sought 
reforms.221 And if the Office is influential, that sometimes happens. 
As with each player discussed in this section, advocacy groups can 
augment or diminish the influence of an Office of Goodness. Offices of 
Goodness often owe their very existence to advocates,222 and lean 
heavily on their support. In part this is because Offices of Goodness are 
sharply limited in how open they can be with their would-be-sponsors 
in Congress. For example, one administration rule governing the 
budgetary process is that in congressional briefings, public meetings, 
and the like, all executive branch officials must support the President’s 
budget, once it exists. So if an Office of Goodness employee is asked in a 
congressional briefing whether the Office needs more money than the 
President’s budget provides, the explicit public answer, at least, must be 
no. Both the agency and the White House use various methods to 
enforce that answer—for example, by sending chaperones to such 
meetings. To state the same point more generally, Offices of Goodness 
are part of the very agency it is their job to constrain, which means they 
must walk a very fine line in discussing their needs, successes, and 
recommendations even with outsiders on whom they depend, whether 
Congress or the White House. Accordingly, in both budgetary and 
policy processes, an Office of Goodness benefits greatly from having a 
surrogate or advocate who can speak more plainly. If advocacy groups 
find value in the Office of Goodness, they are likely to play that role. 
Within the agency, it can actually be quite helpful to the Office if 
advocates somewhat outflank it in their zeal for Goodness. That frames 
the Office’s own views as moderate, helping it to maintain its internal 
credibility. If, however, the divergence between the external Goodness 
position and that of the Office is too great—as it seems to have been in 
the laptop border search case study—that may be quite harmful to the 
Office. An Office of Goodness may gain collegiality points, internally, 
when it takes public hits for its agency’s position. But one of the reasons 
that the agency follows the Office’s advice is in order to at least 
 
 221 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 648 (1998) (“Nongovernmental actors do not work alone. . . . [T]hey 
invariably seek governmental officials who will act as allies and sponsors for the norms they are 
promoting. Once engaged, these governmental norm sponsors work inside bureaucracies and 
governmental structures to promote the same changes inside organized government that 
nongovernmental norm entrepreneurs are urging from the outside.”). 
 222 For example, it was civil rights advocacy groups who dreamed up CRCL as an entity within 
DHS, the first such inward-focused civil rights or civil liberties office. 
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somewhat soften or prevent criticism from the advocacy groups. If 
following Office advice does not accomplish that goal, the Office’s 
internal influence will decline. So, in the laptop border search situation, 
we saw that CRCL made several recommendations made in its impact 
assessment, each accepted by CBP. But accepting those suggestions 
seems to have elicited no good will at all from the advocacy community. 
The result is likely to influence the CBP audience for the next set of 
recommendations, as agency officials question whether a CRCL-
proposed reform really has any external constituency. 
A final way in which advocacy groups can increase or maintain the 
influence of an Office of Goodness is by making its predictions come 
true. If an Office predicts a firestorm of public concern about a 
particular policy, should that policy be implemented and become 
known, it is advocates that foment the firestorm, if they can. (Efforts to 
create a firestorm failed in the NCTC example, above.) And if the Office 
argues within its agency that a policy (perhaps after modifications) is 
fine, it is advocates that refrain from fomenting a firestorm. The point is 
not that advocacy groups carry out their efforts in order to support the 
Office of Goodness, but rather that if the Office proves wrong in its 
predictions, it is likely to lose influence. This creates all the more 
incentive for Office staff to discuss issues with various groups in 
advance, where possible. 
Law and Courts. For many reasons, advocates often prefer law talk 
to policy talk: legal rules govern more than one agency; can outlast a 
single administration; may be court-enforceable; and, perhaps most 
important, resonate with their rights-based politics/orientation.223 But 
Office of Goodness reference to law is double-edged, for several reasons. 
On the one hand, reference to legal obligations is extremely powerful, 
perhaps even trumping of other concerns. On the other hand, for an 
Office of Goodness that is not in a General Counsel’s office, framing an 
issue as a legal one can set up the losing side of an intra-agency conflict; 
it is lawyers in the General Counsel’s office, not Office of Goodness 
staff—even if they are also lawyers—who play the institutional lead role 
with respect to legal questions. In addition, if a question is framed as 
legal and is likely to be litigated, that cedes authority to the courts, 
which may well decide against the views of the Office of Goodness. 
Agency dynamics and the state of the legal precedent will thus dictate 
whether Offices of Goodness are more likely to frame their 
commitments in policy rather than legal terms. 
All that said, Offices of Goodness are likely to lean heavily on court 
decisions that agree with them, or even tilt a bit their way; in the 
 
 223 See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); see also MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). 
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political economy of an agency, such decisions are valuable currency. 
Offices may also make legal arguments with respect to issues in which 
court authority is mixed or that have not yet been litigated in federal 
court. On the other hand, if many courts have come out against a 
particular position, that dampens the availability of that position for an 
Office of Goodness; it would be unlikely to take a legal position more 
protective than court decisions on an issue that has been repeatedly 
litigated. So for example, in the laptop border search case study, above, 
at the time CRCL’s impact assessment was completed, two district 
courts had rendered opinions questioning the right of the government 
to conduct laptop searches absent reasonable suspicion,224 but the 
federal courts of appeals had, as of the time of the impact assessment, 
reversed in both cases and uniformly upheld such searches. No internal 
office like CRCL is likely to opine publicly, and adversely to its agency’s 
frequently asserted litigation position, that those courts are simply 
wrong. 
 
* * * 
 
Offices of Goodness are inherently under siege; efforts to push 
them aside and render them irrelevant are part and parcel of their 
agency’s mission focus. To resist certainly does not require that all the 
external sources of influence just discussed operate in their favor. And 
indeed it is unlikely that this can occur: as Carpenter and Krause have 
explained in work on agency reputation, “the audiences are multiple and 
diverse, so satisfying one audience (e.g., a congressional committee) 
often means perturbing another (e.g., the media).”225 But absent support 
from any external constituency, an Office of Goodness will be hard 
pressed to retain any influence. 
The next section examines how to improve the odds that what 
influence they have is used in service of their assigned value—how, that 
is, they can maintain their commitment, and avoid cooptation or 
capture. 
B.     Commitment 
Offices of Goodness are likely to experience erosion in their staff’s 
commitment to the assigned value, Goodness, as both collegial and 
 
 224 See United States v. Cotterman, No. CR 07–1207–TUC–RCC, 2009 WL 465028 (D. Ariz. 
Feb. 24, 2009), rev’d, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and aff’d en banc on other grounds, 
673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 
523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 225 Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Reputation and Public Administration, 72 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 26, 27 (2011). 
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careerist pressures take their toll. By collegial pressures, I mean the 
ordinary impact of working with mission-focused colleagues not in the 
Office of Goodness. As Herbert Simon said in his foundational work on 
administration, a person “does not live or months or years in a 
particular position in an organization, exposed to some streams of 
communication, shielded from others, without the most profound 
effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, 
emphasizes, fears, and proposes.”226 By careerist pressures, I mean the 
impact of an anticipated career path within the agency, which will push 
Office of Goodness staff to develop reputations as “team players” whose 
approach meshes well and enhances the agency’s primary mission. I 
suggest below that efforts to resist capture must counter both. Those 
who want an Office of Goodness to avoid it must ensure that Office staff 
conceptualize Goodness advocates as part of their reference group—and 
that Office activities remain sufficiently public for that reference group 
to sanction Office staff in some way if they fail to maintain 
commitment. In addition, Office staff must have available and attractive 
career paths involving Goodness advocacy. 
Numerous scholars have written about professional identification 
in government agencies, and how professional commitments and 
professional reference groups, and the cultural distinctions they 
produce, can be outcome-determinative. Magill and Vermeule recast a 
good deal of administrative law in these terms: 
The ongoing contest over the roles of expertise, legalism, and politics 
in administrative law can thus be viewed in sociological terms as a 
contest among different types of professionals, with different types of 
training and priorities. Legal rules and institutional structures that 
empower scientists or engineers will conduce to a technocratic 
agency culture, while rules and structures that empower lawyers will 
carry in their wake the distinctive culture of lawyers.227 
In study after study, the empowering of one or another 
professional group at a particular agency influences that agency’s 
approach to its assignments and challenges.228 Indeed, James Q. Wilson 
argues that the very essence of being a professional is to be  
someone who receives important occupational rewards from a 
reference group whose membership is limited to people who have 
undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a group-
defined code of proper conduct. The more the individual allows his 
 
 226 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, at xvi (3d ed., 1976). 
 227 Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1077–78. 
 228 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 16 (lawyers vs. economists); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. 
Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal Determinants of 
Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1990) (lawyers and 
economists vs. engineers). 
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or her behavior to be influenced by the desire to obtain rewards from 
this reference group, the more professional is his or her 
orientation.229 
Accordingly, “the way such a person defines his or her task may 
reflect more the standards of the external reference group than the 
preferences of the internal management.”230 And “institutionalist” 
sociologists agree that professional networks exert real influence over 
their participants who work in scattered organizations.231 
So for values closely associated with a particular profession, no 
doubt hiring a critical mass of such professionals can assist in 
safeguarding the value. Again, to quote Wilson, “Politicians and interest 
groups know that professionals can define tasks in ways that are hard 
for administrators to alter, and so one strategy for changing an 
organization is to induce it to recruit a professional cadre whose values 
are congenial to those desiring the change.”232 In one example of this 
strategy, we learn from recent work, lawyers within national security 
agencies are assigned to ensure a value I will summarize by the term 
“lawfulness.”233 Other examples abound.234 But what if the profession in 
question does not homogenously embrace the relevant value, Goodness? 
Lawyers’ professional commitments may include lawfulness as an 
overriding value (although the professional value assigned to client-
representation235 competes rather thoroughly). But taking the example 
of DHS’s CRCL, and its more contested assigned values of civil rights 
and civil liberties, the legal profession is certainly not uniformly 
committed to those values.236 After all, in every civil rights case there are 
lawyers on both sides. Accordingly, simple professional ties are far from 
enough to keep Office staff committed to those values, even if they are 
all lawyers. What is needed is ties not to the legal profession as a whole, 
but to a much more specific professional community. (If such a 
professional community is non-existent or inchoate, the task will be 
vastly more difficult.) In the case of a civil rights Office, for example, the 
 
 229 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 60. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See, e.g., MEYER & SCOTT, supra note 219; THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 232 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 64. 
 233 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28. 
 234 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 226; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1498–1501 (2001) (public health 
professionals). 
 235 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A 
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611. 
 236 My point is in some tension with Laura Dickinson’s analysis of JAG Corps lawyers, whom 
she finds dedicated to human rights norms via their commitment to the idea of the rule of law. See 
Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 21–22. 
SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2014 5:17 PM 
2014] OFFICES  OF GOO D NESS  115 
 
key would seem to be sufficient staff connection to the civil rights 
community that its values remain salient and influential 
notwithstanding the contrary pressures inherent in the Office’s position 
within its agency. The Office benefits greatly, that is, if its staff 
conceptualize themselves as, for example, “civil rights lawyers” rather 
than “lawyers in a civil rights office.” 
Connections to a corner of a profession depend on some 
combination of hiring, networking, and career paths. The first of these is 
the most obvious; Office of Goodness can hire experienced staff from 
organizations that share its assigned value.237 In practice, this strategy 
may run into implementation problems because of constraints on 
federal hiring under the civil service human resources rules.238 But 
assuming hiring managers can hire more or less who they choose, 
bringing in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common 
strategy for Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment. 
For example, Douglas NeJaime explains that during the first Obama 
Administration, many civil rights offices hired numerous attorneys 
“with significant cause lawyering experience,” “signal[ing] the likelihood 
of increased action on issues important to the organizations from which 
these lawyers came.”239 And Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan’s 
account of two federal privacy offices similarly stresses that hiring staff 
experienced in the “privacy field” was crucial to the greater success of 
the DHS office, compared to the Department of State office.240 
But even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff 
gain experience within the government, that affiliation is likely to fade 
and their reference group to shift to their more immediate peers. An 
Office of Goodness can push back against this shift by promoting 
opportunities for its staff to network with Goodness advocates, sending 
them to conferences, workshops, and the like. In addition, as Sallyanne 
Payton has written, “[s]tarch for the backbone of weak professional 
groups generally must come from outside.”241 If the reference group 
strategy is going to perform the function of reinforcing Office staff 
 
 237 While his topic was not an Office of Goodness, in his magisterial analysis of the Federal 
Drug Administration, Daniel Carpenter similarly attributes much of its success to its leaders’ 
hiring strategy. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 15 (describing the 
FDA’s pattern of hiring experts who shared its value commitments, and their willingness to join 
the agency because of its excellent reputation). 
 238 Federal hiring managers for civil service jobs can hire only from a list of eligible applicants, 
called a “certificate list,” which is assembled not by the hiring office but by the agency’s human 
resources department. Particularly because an Office of Goodness is such a small part of its 
agency, HR personnel are likely to be quite uninformed about how to evaluate applications, 
leading, in my experience, to frequent misalignments between the composition of the list and the 
Office’s own preferences. (Offices of General Counsel are less constrained, by statute.) 
 239 Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 651 (2009). 
 240 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6. 
 241 See Payton, supra note 207, at 386. 
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commitment to Goodness, it may also be necessary for Office activities 
to be sufficiently public that the outside Goodness advocates can punish 
Office capture with techniques such as harsh questions at those 
conferences or other sorts of private or public criticism. 
Likely even more important is the staff’s expectation about their 
own career paths. If Office of Goodness staff think of their own likely 
path as limited to other agency offices—offices where Goodness, by 
definition, is less central—that is unhelpful for maintaining their zeal. 
But what if they see more possibilities in which Goodness remains 
important? This could be the case if promotion within the Office is 
available and depends on demonstrated commitment, or if they 
contemplate going to work for a different agency’s Office of Goodness 
that shares the same value commitment or for an advocacy 
organization. All these prospects would encourage staff to safeguard 
their own reputations for commitment to Goodness and, less calculated 
but no less important, to maintain their connections to Goodness 
advocates.242 And only if that happens will designating and empowering 
an agency employee or group of agency employees to increase Goodness 
have much chance of actually accomplishing that end. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored an important but essentially unstudied 
institutional device used to induce large bureaucratic governmental 
agencies to heed certain “precarious values,” notwithstanding the 
tension between those values and the agencies’ primary commitments. I 
began by showing how one important Office of Goodness exercised real 
but limited influence in four controversies. I then used those examples 
to inform detailed analysis of the tools Offices of Goodness may use, 
and the prerequisites for Office effectiveness. The Article demonstrates 
the importance of a wider lens—one that incorporates subsidiary agency 
offices, of many types, and a much longer list of bureaucratic 
techniques—for many of the currently hot topics in “internal separation 
of powers.” 
In the realm of policy as well as research, in the Article’s 
introduction, I mentioned that the Office of Goodness strategy is being 
implemented as a solution for a very high-profile controversy. The 
Obama administration has placed a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer 
in the National Security Agency, and has endorsed adding a panel of 
civil liberties advocates to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
 
 242 Cf. KATZMANN, supra note 16 (discussing the career paths of FTC economists and lawyers 
and their influence on staff values). 
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processes for significant cases.243 Some of the insights just developed 
may inform the institutional design choices of would-be reformers, so 
that reforms are more likely to actually serve the “Goodness” values of 
privacy and civil liberties. At the NSA, it is easy to see pitfalls. How 
could a complaint system be constructed when the subjects of 
surveillance do not know their own status? Would an NSA Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Officer be empowered to pursue those values broadly 
conceived, or limited to more narrow conceptions of lawfulness? If the 
latter, it would be difficult for the new Officer to avoid (or surmount) 
conflict with the General Counsel. Would NSA Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Office staff be able to discuss or report publically about any 
problems or recommendations? If not, what kind of external 
reinforcement can they rely upon to maintain their influence within the 
NSA, and how long can we expect their commitment to last? And so on. 
I address these issues at length in a forthcoming article.244 
The idea of harnessing adversarial process for the FISA court seems 
less fraught. American law has a long tradition of bringing outsider 
lawyers into litigation processes; the contours of the role of government-
paid challenger—e.g., public defender—are solidly established in the 
legal profession. I surmise that this would make role commitment far 
easier to maintain. Moreover, external influence-reinforcement seems 
less crucial when there is a formally structured decisionmaking process 
with its own norms of reasoned elaboration.245 
The overall point—and this is the Article’s most important 
practical lesson—is that Office of Goodness efficacy should not be taken 
for granted. Unless the goal is purely cosmetic, a new Office’s tools must 
be carefully prepared, and its influence and commitment purposefully 
produced and maintained. In identifying and analyzing this critical 
administrative strategy, this Article offers insight about how to make it 
work, and also has opened up additional research questions for further 
exploration. 
 
 243 See supra Introduction. 
 244 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties 
Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2495844. 
 245 I don’t mean to be naïve in making this point. Of course there is abundant reason in 
litigation settings to worry that “the haves come out ahead.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). But 
in litigation, the “have-nots” can at least get a seat at the table and a chance to speak. Without 
external reinforcement, an Office of Goodness may be denied even access. 
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